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Abstract. We extend the quantitative synthesis framework by going beyond the worst-case. On the
one hand, classical analysis of two-player games involves an adversary (modeling the environment of the
system) which is purely antagonistic and asks for strict guarantees. On the other hand, stochastic models
like Markov decision processes represent situations where the system is faced to a purely randomized
environment: the aim is then to optimize the expected payoff, with no guarantee on individual outcomes.
We introduce the beyond worst-case synthesis problem, which is to construct strategies that guarantee
some quantitative requirement in the worst-case while providing a higher expected value against a
particular stochastic model of the environment given as input. This problem is relevant to produce
system controllers that provide nice expected performance in the everyday situation while ensuring a
strict (but relaxed) performance threshold even in the event of very bad (while unlikely) circumstances.
We study the beyond worst-case synthesis problem for two important quantitative settings: the mean-
payoff and the shortest path. In both cases, we show how to decide the existence of finite-memory
strategies satisfying the problem and how to synthesize one if one exists. We establish algorithms and
we study complexity bounds and memory requirements.
1 Introduction
Classical models. Two-player zero-sum quantitative games [19,45,6] and Markov decision processes (ab-
brev. MDPs) [36,9] are two popular formalisms for modeling decision making in adversarial and uncertain
environments respectively. In the former, two players compete with opposite goals (zero-sum), and we want
strategies for player 1 (the system) that ensure a given minimal performance against all possible strategies
of player 2 (its environment). In the latter, the system plays against a stochastic model of its environment,
and we want strategies that ensure a good expected overall performance. Those two models are well studied
and simple optimal memoryless strategies exist for classical objectives such as mean-payoff [33,19,20] or
shortest path [2,17]. But both models have clear weaknesses: strategies that are good for the worst-case may
exhibit suboptimal behaviors in probable situations while strategies that are good for the expectation may
be terrible in some unlikely but possible situations.
What if we want both? In practice, we would like to have strategies that are both ensuring (a) some worst-
case threshold no matter how the adversary behaves (i.e., against any arbitrary strategy) and (b) a good
expectation against the expected behavior of the adversary (given as a stochastic model). This is the subject
of this paper: we show how to construct finite-memory strategies that ensure both (a) and (b). We consider
finite-memory strategies for player 1 as they can be implemented in practice (as opposed to infinite-memory
ones). Player 2 is not restricted in his choice of strategies, but we will see that simple strategies suffice. Our
problem, the beyond worst-case synthesis problem, is interesting for any quantitative measure, but we
give here a thorough study of two classical ones: the mean-payoff, and the shortest path. Our results are
summarized in Table 1.
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worst-case expected value BWC
mean-payoff
complexity NP ∩ coNP P NP ∩ coNP
memory memoryless pseudo-poly.
shortest path
complexity P pseudo-poly. / NP-hard
memory memoryless pseudo-poly.
Table 1: Overview of decision problem complexities and (tight) memory requirements for winning strategies
of player 1 in games (worst-case), MDPs (expected value) and the BWC setting (combination).
Example. Let us consider the weighted game in Fig. 1 to illustrate the shortest path context. Circle states
belong to player 1, square states to player 2, integer labels are durations in minutes, and fractions are
probabilities that model the expected behavior of player 2. Player 1 wants a strategy to go from “home”
to “work” such that “work” is guaranteed to be reached within 60 minutes (to avoid missing an important
meeting), and player 1 would also like to minimize the expected time to reach “work”. First, note that the
strategy that minimizes the expectation is to take the car (expectation is 33 minutes) but this strategy is
excluded as there is a possibility to arrive after 60 minutes (in case of heavy traffic). Bicycle is safe but
the expectation of this solution is 45 minutes. We can do better with the following strategy: try to take
the train, if the train is delayed three times consecutively, then go back home and take the bicycle. This
strategy is safe as it always reaches “work” within 58 minutes and its expectation is ≈ 37, 45 minutes (so
better than taking directly the bicycle). Observe that this simple example already shows that, unlike the
situation for classical games and MDPs, strategies using memory are strictly more powerful than memoryless
ones. Our algorithms are able to decide the existence of (and synthesize) such finite-memory strategies.
home
station traffic
waiting
room
work
1
10
9
10
2
10
7
10
1
10
train
2
car
1
back home
2
bicycle
45
delay
1
wait
3
light
20
medium
30
heavy
70
departs
35
Fig. 1: Player 1 wants to minimize its ex-
pected time to reach “work”, but while en-
suring it is less than one hour in all cases.
Contributions. Our main results are the following. First, for
the mean-payoff value, we provide an algorithm (Thm. 1) that
implies NP ∩ coNP-membership of the problem, which would
reduce to P if mean-payoff games were proved to be in P, a
long-standing open problem [6,10]. Pseudo-polynomial memory
may be necessary and always suffices (Thm. 4). Finally, we ob-
serve that infinite-memory strategies are strictly more power-
ful that finite-memory strategies (Sect. 4.11). Second, for the
shortest path, we provide a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
(Thm. 5), and show that the associated decision problem is NP-
hard (Thm. 7). According to a very recent result by Haase and
Kiefer [27], our reduction even proves PP-hardness, which sug-
gests that the problem does not belong to NP at all otherwise
the polynomial hierarchy would collapse. Pseudo-polynomial
memory may be necessary and always suffices (Thm. 6). In
the case of the shortest path problem, infinite-memory strate-
gies give no additional power in comparison with finite-memory
strategies (Rem. 10).
Related work. This paper extends previous works presented
in conferences [8,7] and in a PhD thesis [37]: it gives a full presentation of the technical details, along with
additional results. Our problems generalize the corresponding problems for two-player zero-sum games and
MDPs. In mean-payoff games, optimal memoryless worst-case strategies exist and the best known complexity
is NP∩ coNP [19,45,6]. For the shortest path, we consider game graphs with strictly positive weights ant try
to minimize the cost to target: memoryless strategies also suffice, and the problem is in P [32]. In MDPs,
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optimal strategies for the expectation are studied in [36,20] for the mean-payoff and the shortest path: in
both cases, memoryless strategies suffice and they can be computed in polynomial time.
Our strategies are strongly risk averse: they avoid at all cost outcomes that are below a given threshold
(no matter what is their probability), and inside the set of those safe strategies, we maximize expectation.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider such strategies. Other different notions of risk have
been studied for MDPs: for example in [44], the authors want to find policies which minimize the probability
(risk) that the total discounted rewards do not exceed a specified value (target), or in [21] the authors
want policies that achieve a specified value of the long-run limiting average reward at a specified probability
level (percentile). The latter problem has been recently extended significantly in the framework of percentile
queries, which provide elaborate guarantees on the performance profile of strategies in multi-dimensional
MDPs [38]. While all those strategies limit risk, they only ensure low probability for bad behaviors but they
do not ensure their absence, furthermore, they do not ensure good expectation either.
Another body of work is the study of strategies in MDPs that achieve a trade-off between the expectation
and the variance over the outcomes (e.g., [5] for the mean-payoff, [34] for the cumulative reward), giving
a statistical measure of the stability of the performance. In our setting, we strengthen this requirement by
asking for strict guarantees on individual outcomes, while maintaining an appropriate expected payoff.
A survey of rich behavioral models extending the classical approaches for MDPs — including the beyond
worst-case framework presented here — was published in [39], with a focus on the shortest path problem.
In this paper, we focus on finite-memory strategies. The synthesis of infinite-memory strategies for the
beyond worst-case mean-payoff problem was recently addressed in [13].
Structure of the paper. In Sect. 2, we introduce the necessary definitions. In Sect. 3, we formally define
the beyond worst-case synthesis problem. Sect. 4 and Sect. 5 are respectively devoted to the solutions for the
mean-payoff and the shortest path. We conclude (Sect. 6) with a comparative note on the two solutions.
2 Preliminaries
Weighted directed graphs. A weighted directed graph is a tuple G = (S,E,w) where (i) S is the set of
vertices, called states; (ii) E ⊆ S × S is the set of directed edges; and (iii) w : E → Z is the weight labeling
function. Since we only work with directed graphs in the following, we omit the adjective and talk about
weighted graphs. Also, in the sequel, we almost exclusively work with finite graphs, i.e., graphs for which
the set of states S is finite. Given a state s ∈ S, we denote by Succ(s) = {s′ ∈ S | (s, s′) ∈ E} the set of
successors of s by edges in E. We assume that graphs are non-blocking, i.e., for all s ∈ S, Succ(s) 6= ∅. We
denote by W the largest absolute weight that appears in the graph. We assume that weights are encoded in
binary and denote by V = ⌈log2W ⌉ the number of bits of their encoding.
A play in G from an initial state sinit ∈ S is an infinite sequence of states pi = s0s1s2 . . . such that s0 = sinit
and (si, si+1) ∈ E for all i ≥ 0. The prefix up to the n-th state of pi is the finite sequence pi(n) = s0s1 . . . sn.
We resp. denote the first and last states of the prefix by First(pi(n)) = s0 and Last(pi(n)) = sn. For a play pi, we
naturally extend the notation to First(pi). The set of plays of G is denoted by Plays(G) and the corresponding
set of prefixes is denoted by Prefs(G). Given a play pi ∈ Plays(G), we denote by Inf(pi) ⊆ S the set of states
that are visited infinitely often along the play.
Given a function f : Plays(G) → R ∪ {−∞, ∞}, the value of a play pi is denoted by f(pi). We consider
two classical value functions, the total-payoff and the mean-payoff, defined as follows. The total-payoff of
a prefix ρ = s0s1 . . . sn is TP(ρ) =
∑i=n−1
i=0 w((si, si+1)), and its mean-payoff is MP(ρ) =
1
n
TP(ρ). This
is naturally extended to plays by considering the limit behavior: the total-payoff of a play pi is TP(pi) =
lim infn→∞ TP(pi(n)) and its mean-payoff is MP(pi) = lim infn→∞MP(pi(n)). Given a graph G where all
weights are strictly positive (i.e., w : E → N0) and a target set of states T ⊆ S, we define the truncated sum
up to T as TST : Plays(G) → N ∪ {∞}, TST (pi = s0s1s2 . . . ) =
∑n−1
i=0 w((si, si+1)), with n the first index
such that sn ∈ T , and TST (pi) = ∞ if pi never reaches any state in T . As all weights are strictly positive,
it is possible to reduce the truncated sum to the total-payoff (i.e., for all pi ∈ Plays(G), TST (pi) = TP(pi))
by making all states of T absorbing with a self-loop of zero weight. That is, for all s ∈ T , we have that
Succ(s) = {s} and w((s, s)) = 0.
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Probability distributions. Given a finite set A, a (rational) probability distribution on A is a function
p : A → [0, 1] ∩ Q such that
∑
a∈A p(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions on A by D(A).
The support of the probability distribution p on A is Supp(p) = {a ∈ A | p(a) > 0}.
Two-player games. We consider two-player turn-based games and denote the two players by P1 and P2.
A finite two-player game is a tuple G = (G, S1, S2) composed of (i) a finite weighted graph G = (S,E,w);
and (ii) a partition of its states S into S1 and S2 that resp. denote the sets of states belonging to P1 and P2.
A prefix pi(n) of a play pi belongs to Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, if Last(pi(n)) ∈ Si. The set of prefixes that belong to Pi
is denoted by Prefsi(G). We sometimes denote by |G| the size of a game, defined as a polynomial function
of |S|, |E| and V = ⌈log2W ⌉.
Strategies. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, a strategy for player Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is a function
λi : Prefsi(G) → D(S) such that for all ρ ∈ Prefsi(G), we have Supp(λi(ρ)) ⊆ Succ(Last(ρ)). A strategy is
called pure if it is deterministic, i.e., if its support is a singleton for all prefixes. When a strategy λi of Pi is
pure, we sometimes simplify its notation and write λi(ρ) = s instead of λi(ρ)(s) = 1, for any ρ ∈ Prefsi(G)
and the unique state s ∈ Supp(λi(ρ)).
A strategy λi for Pi has finite memory if it can be encoded by a stochastic finite state machine with
outputs, called stochastic Moore machine, M(λi) = (Mem,m0, αu, αn), where (i) Mem is a finite set of
memory elements, (ii) m0 ∈ Mem is the initial memory element, (iii) αu : Mem × S → Mem is the update
function, and (iv) αn : Mem× Si → D(S) is the next-action function. If the game is in s ∈ Si and m ∈ Mem
is the current memory element, then the strategy chooses s′, the next state of the game, according to the
probability distribution αn(m, s). When the game leaves a state s ∈ S, the memory is updated to αu(m, s).
Hence updates are deterministic and outputs are potentially stochastic. Formally, (Mem,m0, αu, αn) defines
the strategy λi such that λi(ρ · s) = αn(αˆu(m0, ρ), s) for all ρ ∈ Prefs(G) and s ∈ Si, where αˆu extends αu to
sequences of states starting from m0 as expected. Note that pure finite-memory strategies have deterministic
next-action functions. A strategy is memoryless if |Mem| = 1, i.e., it does not depend on the history but
only on the current state of the game.
We resp. denote by Λi(G), Λ
F
i (G), Λ
PF
i (G), Λ
M
i (G) and Λ
PM
i (G) the sets of general (i.e., possibly random-
ized and infinite-memory), finite-memory, pure finite-memory, memoryless and pure memoryless strategies
for player Pi on the game G. We do not write G in this notation when the context is clear. A play pi
is said to be consistent with a strategy λi ∈ Λi if for all n ≥ 0 such that Last(pi(n)) ∈ Si, we have
Last(pi(n+ 1)) ∈ Supp(λi(pi(n)).
Markov decisions processes. A finite Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple P = (G, S1, S∆, ∆) where
(i) G = (S,E,w) is a finite weighted graph, (ii) S1 and S∆ define a partition of the set of states S into states
of P1 and stochastic states, and (iii) ∆ : S∆ → D(S) is the transition function that, given a stochastic state
s ∈ S∆, defines the probability distribution ∆(s) over the possible successors of s, such that for all states
s ∈ S∆, Supp(∆(s)) ⊆ Succ(s).
In contrast to some other classical definitions of MDPs in the literature, we explicitly allow that, for
some states s ∈ S∆, Supp(∆(s)) ( Succ(s): some edges of the graph G are assigned probability zero by the
transition function. This is important as far as modeling is concerned, as in our context, transition functions
will be defined according to a stochastic model for the environment of a system, and we cannot reasonably
assume that such a model always involves all possible actions of the environment: it is possible that some
actions are only used by an antagonistic environment, in our two-player game view. Hence, we study the
most general setting — where edges of probability zero are allowed. Consequently, given the MDP P , we
define the subset of edges E∆ = {(s1, s2) ∈ E | s1 ∈ S∆ ⇒ s2 ∈ Supp(∆(s1))}, representing all edges that
either start in a state of P1, or are chosen with non-zero probability by the transition function ∆.
An MDP can be seen as a two-player game where P1 is playing against a probabilistic adversary using a
fixed randomized memoryless strategy∆ in states of the set S∆. Hence MDPs are sometimes called 1
1
2 -player
games. The notions of prefixes belonging to P1 and of strategies for P1 are naturally extended to MDPs.
End-components. We define end-components (ECs) of an MDP as subgraphs in which P1 can ensure
to stay despite stochastic states [16]. Formally, let P = (G, S1, S∆, ∆) be an MDP, with G = (S,E,w) its
underlying graph. An EC in P is a set U ⊆ S such that (i) the subgraph (U,E∆ ∩ (U × U)) is strongly
connected, with E∆ defined as before, i.e., stochastic edges with probability zero are treated as non-existent;
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and (ii) for all s ∈ U ∩ S∆, Supp(∆(s)) ⊆ U , i.e., in stochastic states, all outgoing edges either stay in U or
belong to E \E∆ (that is, the probability of leaving U from a state s ∈ S∆ is zero). The set of all ECs of P
is denoted E ⊆ 2S .
Markov chains. A finite Markov chain (MC) is a tuple M = (G, δ) where (i) G = (S,E,w) is a finite
weighted graph; and (ii) δ : S → D(S) is the transition function that, given a state s ∈ S, defines the
probability distribution δ(s) over the successors of s, such that for all states s ∈ S, Supp(δ(s)) ⊆ Succ(s).
In a Markov chain M = (G, δ), an event is a measurable set of plays A ⊆ Plays(G). Every event has a
uniquely defined probability [42] (Carathe´odory’s extension theorem induces a unique probability measure
on the Borel σ-algebra over Plays(G)). We denote by PMsinit(A) the probability that a play belongs to A when
the Markov chain M starts in sinit ∈ S and is executed for an infinite number of steps. Given a measurable
value function f : Plays(G) → R ∪ {−∞, ∞}, we denote by EMsinit(f) the expected value or expectation of f
over a play starting in sinit. The σ-algebra is defined through cylinder sets of prefixes: each prefix ρ defines
a set of plays pi such that ρ is a prefix of pi [1]. Hence, the notions of probability and expected value can
naturally be used over prefixes by considering the plays belonging to their cylinder set.
Projections. Given a set Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ k of a cartesian product A1 × . . . ×Ak, we define the projection over
Ai, denoted by projAi : A1× . . . ×Ak → Ai, as the mapping from elements a = (a1, . . . , ak) to projAi(a) = ai.
Outcomes. Let M = (G, δ) be a Markov chain, with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph. Given an initial
state sinit ∈ S, we define the set of its possible outcomes as
OutsM (sinit) = {pi = s0s1s2 . . . ∈ Plays(G) | s0 = sinit ∧ ∀n ∈ N, sn+1 ∈ Supp(δ(sn))} .
Note that if δ is deterministic (i.e., if the support is a singleton) in all states, we obtain a unique play
pi = s0s1s2 . . . as the unique possible outcome.
Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph. Given two strategies,
λ1 ∈ Λ1 and λ2 ∈ Λ2, and an initial state sinit ∈ S, we extend the notion of outcomes as follows:
OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2) = {pi = s0s1s2 . . . ∈ Plays(G) | s0 = sinit ∧ pi is consistent with λ1 and λ2} .
Observe that when fixing the strategies, we obtain an MC denoted by G[λ1, λ2]. This MC is finite if both λ1
and λ2 are finite-memory strategies. Let M(λ1) = (Mem1,m1, α1u, α
1
n) and M(λ2) = (Mem2,m2, α
2
u, α
2
n) be
the Moore machines of two such strategies. The set of states of the resulting MC is obtained through the
product of the memory elements of the strategies given as Moore machines and the states of the game,
i.e., S ×Mem1 ×Mem2; and its transition function is defined based on the distributions prescribed by the
strategies and in order to accurately account for the memory updates. Notice that the outcomes of G and
G[λ1, λ2] are different objects by nature: the former are plays on a graph defined by the set of states S while
the latter are plays on a graph defined by S×Mem1×Mem2. Still, there exists a bijection between outcomes
of the MC and their traces in the initial game, thanks to the projection operator (Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a game, with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph. Let λ1 ∈ ΛF1 and
λ2 ∈ ΛF2 be the finite-memory strategies of the players. Then there is a bijection between outcomes in G and
outcomes in the resulting Markov chain G[λ1, λ2].
Proof. Let sinit ∈ S be the initial state of G, M(λ1) = (Mem1,m1, α1u, α
1
n) and M(λ2) = (Mem2,m2, α
2
u, α
2
n)
be the Moore machines. Consider an outcome in G[λ1, λ2]: it is a sequence of states from S×Mem1×Mem2.
Obviously, its projection on the set S is unique and defines the outcome in the sense of G.
Conversely, consider an outcome in G: it is of the form s0s1s2 . . . ∈ Sω, with s0 = sinit. We claim there is
a unique corresponding outcome in G[λ1, λ2], written (s0,m
0
1,m
0
2)(s1,m
1
1,m
1
2) . . . ∈ S ×Mem1×Mem2, with
(s0,m
0
1,m
0
2) = (sinit,m1,m2). Indeed, it suffices to see that the update functions of the Moore machines, α
1
u
and α2u, are deterministic functions. Hence, it is easy to reconstruct the outcome of G[λ1, λ2] based on its
projection on S as it suffices to apply the effect of the update functions on the memory at each step. ⊓⊔
Hence, we obtain the following equality: OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2) = projS
(
OutsG[λ1,λ2]((sinit,m1,m2))
)
. Based on
this, and for the sake of readability, we abuse the notation and write OutsG[λ1,λ2](sinit) equivalently to refer
to this set of outcomes. Similar abuse is taken for value functions and initial states.
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Back to the outcomes of the game: note that if both strategies λ1 and λ2 are pure, the resulting Markov
chain only involves Dirac distributions (δ is deterministic) and the set OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2) is composed of a
unique play pi = s0s1s2 . . . such that for all n ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, if sn ∈ Si, then we have λi(sn) = sn+1.
Let P = (G, S1, S∆, ∆) be a Markov decision process, with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph. Again, we
can fix the strategy λ1 of P1 and obtain the Markov chain P [λ1]. Let M(λ1) = (Mem,m0, αu, αn). The set
of outcomes starting in sinit ∈ S is defined as OutsP (sinit, λ1) = projS
(
OutsP [λ1]((sinit,m0))
)
. Again, we abuse
the notation and write OutsP [λ1](sinit) equivalently.
Finally, back to the two-player game G, if we fix the strategy λi of only one player Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, we
obtain not a Markov chain, but a Markov decision process for the remaining player P3−i. This MDP is
denoted by G[λi]. We define its set of outcomes as
OutsG(sinit, λi) =
⋃
λ3−i ∈Λ3−i
OutsG[λi](sinit, λ3−i) =
⋃
λ3−i ∈Λ3−i
OutsG[λ1,λ2](sinit).
Attractors. Given a game G = (G, S1, S2), G = (S,E,w), the attractor for P1 of a set A ⊆ S in G is
denoted by AttrP1G (A) and computed as the fixed point of the sequence Attr
P1, n+1
G (A) = Attr
P1, n
G (A) ∪ {s ∈
S1 | ∃ (s, t) ∈ E, t ∈ Attr
P1, n
G (A)} ∪ {s ∈ S2 | ∀ (s, t) ∈ E, t ∈ Attr
P1, n
G (A)}, with Attr
P1, 0
G (A) = A. It is
exactly the set of states from which P1 can ensure to reach A no matter what P2 does. That is, Attr
P1
G (A) =
{s ∈ S | ∃λ1 ∈ Λ1(G), ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2(G), ∀pi = s0s1s2 . . . ∈ OutsG(s, λ1, λ2), s0 = s, ∃ i ∈ N, si ∈ A}. We define
symmetrically AttrP2G (A), the attractor for P2.
Subgraphs, subgames and sub-MDPs. Given a graph G = (S,E,w) and a subset of states A ⊆ S, we
define the induced subgraph G ⇂ A = (A,E ∩ (A × A), w) naturally. Subgames and sub-MDPs are defined
similarly by considering their induced subgraphs. It is to note that subgames and sub-MDPs can only be
properly defined if the induced subgraphs contain no deadlock and if the transition functions remain well-
defined in the case of MDPs (i.e., if the probabilities on outgoing edges still sum up to one in all stochastic
states of the sub-MDP).
Worst-case synthesis. Given a two-player game G = (G, S1, S2), with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph,
an initial state sinit ∈ S, a value function f : Plays(G)→ R ∪ {−∞, ∞}, and a rational threshold µ ∈ Q, the
worst-case threshold problem asks to decide if P1 has a strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1 such that for all λ2 ∈ Λ2, for all
pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), we have that f(pi) ≥ µ.
For the mean-payoff value function, pure memoryless optimal4 strategies exist for both players [33,19].
Hence, deciding the winner is in NP ∩ coNP, and it was furthermore shown to be in UP ∩ coUP [45,31,23].
Whether the problem is in P is a long-standing open problem [6,10]. Total-payoff value functions also
yield pure memoryless optimal strategies for both players [24] and the associated decision problem is in
UP ∩ coUP [23]. For the truncated sum function, which can be seen as a particular instance of total-payoff,
it can be shown that the decision problem takes polynomial time [32], as a winning strategy of P1 should
avoid all cycles (because they yield strictly positive costs), hence usage of attractors and comparison of the
worst possible sum of costs with the threshold suffices.
Expected value synthesis.Given MDP P = (G, S1, S∆, ∆), with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, initial
state sinit ∈ S, measurable value function f : Plays(G) → R ∪ {−∞, ∞}, and rational threshold ν ∈ Q, the
expected value threshold problem asks to decide if P1 has a strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1 such that E
P [λ1]
sinit (f) ≥ ν.
Optimal expected mean-payoff in MDPs can be achieved by memoryless strategies, and the corresponding
decision problem can be solved in polynomial time through linear programming [20]. The truncated sum
value function has been studied in the literature under the name of shortest path problem: again, memoryless
strategies suffice and the problem is solvable in polynomial time via linear programming [2,17].
4 A strategy for Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is said to be optimal if it ensures a threshold higher or equal to the threshold ensured
by any other strategy of the same player. The threshold ensured by an optimal strategy is called the optimal value.
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3 Beyond Worst-Case Synthesis
We here define the beyond worst-case synthesis problem. Our goal is to study the synthesis of finite-memory
strategies that, simultaneously, ensure a value greater than some threshold µ in the worst-case situation (i.e.,
against any strategy of the adversary), and ensure an expected value greater than some threshold ν against
a given finite-memory stochastic model of the adversary (e.g., representing commonly observed behavior of
the environment).
Definition 1. Given a game G = (G, S1, S2), with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, an initial state
sinit ∈ S, a finite-memory stochastic model λstoch2 ∈ Λ
F
2 of the adversary, represented by a stochastic Moore
machine, a measurable value function f : Plays(G) → R ∪ {−∞, ∞}, and two rational thresholds µ, ν ∈ Q,
the beyond worst-case (BWC) problem asks to decide if P1 has a finite-memory strategy λ1 ∈ ΛF1 such that{
∀λ2 ∈ Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), f(pi) > µ (1)
E
G[λ1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (f) > ν (2)
and the BWC synthesis problem asks to synthesize such a strategy if one exists.
We take the convention to ask for values strictly greater than the thresholds in order to ease the formulation
of our results in the following. Indeed, we will show that for some thresholds, it is possible to synthesize
strategies that ensure ε-close values, for any ε > 0, while it is not feasible to achieve the exact threshold
(Sect. 4.11). Using the strict inequality, we avoid tedious manipulation of such ε in our proofs. Notice that
we can assume ν > µ, otherwise the problem reduces to the classical worst-case analysis as follows. Assume
µ ≥ ν and λpm1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 satisfies the worst-case threshold (recall memory is not necessary for the worst-
case requirement alone). Consider the MC G[λpm1 , λ
stoch
2 ]. By Eq. (1) and Lemma 1, we have that for all
pi ∈ OutsG[λpm
1
,λstoch
2
](sinit), f(pi) > µ. Hence, regardless of how the probability is defined in the MC, we have
that E
G[λpm
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (f) > µ ≥ ν and Eq. (2) is trivially satisfied.
4 Mean-Payoff Value Function
The first value function that we study is the mean-payoff. We present an algorithm, BWC MP (Alg. 1), for
deciding the corresponding BWC problem. Its cornerstones are highlighted in Sect. 4.1. A running example
is presented in Sect. 4.2. Sections 4.3 through 4.8 are devoted to a detailed justification of this algorithm and
the proof of its correctness. In Sect. 4.9, we prove that our algorithm implies NP∩coNP-membership and that
it is optimal with regard to the complexity of the worst-case problem. Thus, the BWC framework for mean-
payoff remarkably provides additional modeling power without negative impact on the complexity class. In
Sect. 4.10, we prove that pseudo-polynomial memory is sufficient and in general necessary for finite-memory
strategies satisfying the BWC mean-payoff problem (polynomial in the size of the game and the stochastic
model, and in the values of weights and thresholds). Finally, we show in Sect. 4.11 that infinite-memory
strategies are strictly more powerful than finite-memory ones for P1. This is in contrast with the worst-case
and the expected value settings, where memoryless strategies always suffice.
4.1 The approach in a nutshell
Algorithm BWC MP is described in Alg. 1. We give an intuitive sketch of its functioning in the following.
Inputs and outputs. The algorithm takes as input: a game Gi, a finite-memory stochastic model of the
adversary λi2, a worst-case threshold µ
i, an expected value threshold νi, and an initial state siinit. Its output
is Yes if and only if there exists a finite-memory strategy of P1 satisfying the BWC problem (Def. 1).
The output as described in Alg. 1 is boolean: the algorithm answers whether a satisfying strategy exists or
not, but does not explicitely construct it (to avoid tedious formalization within the pseudocode). Nevertheless,
we present how to synthesize such a winning strategy in Sect. 4.8. We sketch its operation in the following and
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Algorithm 1 BWC MP(Gi, λi2, µ
i, νi, siinit)
Input: Gi =
(
Gi, Si1, S
i
2
)
a game, Gi =
(
Si, Ei, wi
)
its underlying graph, λi2 ∈ Λ
F
2 (G
i) a finite-memory stochastic
model of the adversary, M(λi2) = (Mem,m0, αu, αn) its Moore machine, µ
i = a
b
, νi ∈ Q, µi < νi, resp. the
worst-case and the expected value thresholds, and siinit ∈ S
i the initial state
Output: Yes if and only if P1 has a finite-memory strategy λ1 ∈ Λ
F
1 (G
i) satisfying the BWC problem from siinit, for
the thresholds pair (µi, νi) and the mean-payoff value function
{Preprocessing}
1: if µi 6= 0 then
2: Modify the weight function of Gi s.t. ∀ e ∈ Ei, winew(e) := b · w
i(e) − a, and consider the new thresholds pair
(0, ν := b · νi − a)
3: Compute SWC :=
{
s ∈ Si | ∃λ1 ∈ Λ1(G
i), ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2(G
i), ∀ pi ∈ OutsGi(s, λ1, λ2), MP(pi) > 0
}
4: if siinit 6∈ SWC then
5: return No
6: else
7: Let Gw := Gi ⇂ SWC be the subgame induced by worst-case winning states
8: Build G := Gw ⊗M(λi2) = (G, S1, S2), G = (S,E,w), S ⊆ (SWC ×Mem), the game obtained by product with
the Moore machine, and sinit := (s
i
init,m0) the corresponding initial state
9: Let λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 (G) be the memoryless transcription of λ
i
2 on G
10: Let P := G[λstoch2 ] = (G, S1, S∆ = S2,∆ = λ
stoch
2 ) be the MDP obtained from G and λ
stoch
2
{Main algorithm}
11: Compute Uw the set of maximal winning end-components of P
12: Build P ′ = (G′, S1, S∆,∆), where G
′ = (S,E,w′) and w′ is defined as follows:
∀ e = (s1, s2) ∈ E, w
′(e) :=
{
w(e) if ∃ U ∈ Uw s.t. {s1, s2} ⊆ U
0 otherwise
13: Compute the maximal expected value ν∗ from sinit in P
′
14: if ν∗ > ν then
15: return Yes
16: else
17: return No
we highlight the role of each step of the algorithm in the construction of this winning strategy, as producing
a witness winning strategy is a straightforward by-product of the process we apply to decide satisfaction of
the BWC problem.
Preprocessing. The first part of the algorithm (lines 1-10) is a preprocessing of the game Gi and the
stochatic model λi2 given as inputs in order to apply the second part of the algorithm (lines 11-17) on a
modified game G and stochastic model λstoch2 , simpler to manipulate. We show in the following that the
answer to the BWC problem on the modified game is Yes if and only if it is also Yes on the input game,
and we present how a winning strategy of P1 in G can be transferred to a winning strategy in Gi.
The preprocessing is composed of four main steps. First, we modify the weight function of Gi in order to
consider the equivalent BWC problem with thresholds (0, ν) instead of (µi, νi). This classical trick is used
to get rid of explicitely considering the worst-case threshold in the following, as it is equal to zero. Second,
observe that any strategy that is winning for the BWC problem must also be winning for the classical worst-
case problem. Such a strategy cannot allow visits of any state from which P1 cannot ensure winning against
an antagonistic adversary because mean-payoff is a prefix-independent (i.e., for all ρ ∈ Prefs(G), pi ∈ Plays(G),
we have that MP(ρ · pi) = MP(pi)) objective (hence it is not possible to “win” it over the finite prefix up
to such a state). Hence, we reduce our study to Gw, the subgame induced by worst-case winning states in
Gi (lines 3 and 7). Obviously, if from the initial state siinit, P1 cannot win the worst-case problem, then the
answer to the BWC problem is No (lines 4-5). Third, we build the game G which states are defined by the
product of the states of Gw and the memory elements of the Moore machine M(λi2) (line 8). Intuitively, we
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expand the initial game by integrating the memory of the stochastic model of P2 in the graph. Note that this
does not modify the power of the adversary. Fourth, the finite-memory stochastic model λi2 on G
i clearly
translates to a memoryless stochastic model λstoch2 on G (line 9). This will help us obtain elegant proofs for
the second part of the algorithm.
Analysis of end-components. The second part of the algorithm (lines 11-17) hence operates on a game
G such that from all states, P1 has a strategy to achieve a strictly positive mean-payoff value (recall µ = 0).
We consider the MDP P = G[λstoch2 ] and notice that the underlying graphs of G and P are the same thanks
to λstoch2 being memoryless. The following steps analyze end-components in the MDP, i.e., strongly connected
subgraphs in which P1 can ensure to stay when playing against the stochastic adversary (cf. Sect. 2).
The motivation to the analysis of ECs is the following. It is well-known that under any arbitrary strategy
λ1 ∈ Λ1 of P1 in P , the probability that states visited infinitely often along an outcome constitute an EC
is one [14,16]. Recall that the mean-payoff is prefix-independent, therefore the value of any outcome only
depends on those states that are seen infinitely often. Hence, the expected mean-payoff in P [λ1] depends
uniquely on the value obtained in the ECs. Inside an EC, we can compute the maximal expected value that
can be achieved by P1, and this value is the same in all states of the EC [20].
Consequently, in order to satisfy the expected value requirement (Eq. (2)), an acceptable strategy for
the BWC problem has to favor reaching ECs with a sufficient expectation, but under the constraint that
it should also ensure satisfaction of the worst-case requirement (Eq. (1)). As we will show, this constraint
implies that some ECs with high expected values may still need to be avoided because they do not permit
to guarantee the worst-case requirement. This is the cornerstone of the classification of ECs that follows.
Classification of end-components. Let E ⊆ 2S be the set of all ECs in MDP P . By definition, only edges
in E∆, as defined in Sect. 2, are involved to determine which sets of states form an EC in P . As such, for any
EC U ∈ E , there may exist edges from E \ E∆ starting in U , such that P2 can force leaving U when using
an arbitrary strategy. Still these edges will never be used by the stochastic model λstoch2 . This remark will
be important to the definition of strategies of P1 that guarantee the worst-case requirement, as P1 needs to
be able to react to the hypothetic use of such an edge. We will see in the following that it is also the case
inside an EC.
Now, we want to consider the ECs in which P1 can ensure that the worst-case requirement will be
fulfilled (i.e., without having to leave the EC): we call them winning ECs. Indeed, the others will need to
be eventually avoided, hence will have zero impact on the expectation of a finite-memory strategy satisfying
the BWC problem. So we call the latter losing ECs. The subtlety of this classication is that it involves
considering the ECs both in the MDP P , and in the game G. Formally, let U ∈ E be an EC. It is winning
if, in the subgame G ⇂ U , from all states, P1 has a strategy to ensure a strictly positive mean-payoff against
any strategy of P2 that only chooses edges which are assigned non-zero probability by λstoch2 , or equivalently,
edges in E∆. We denote W ⊆ E the set of such ECs. Non-winning ECs are losing: in those, whatever the
strategy of P1 played against the stochastic model λstoch2 (or any strategy with the same support), there
exists at least one outcome for which the mean-payoff is not strictly positive (even if its probability is zero,
its mere existence is not acceptable for the worst-case requirement).
Maximal winning end-components. Based on these definitions, see that line 11 of algorithm BWC MP
does not actually compute the set W containing all winning ECs, but rather the set Uw ⊆ W , defined as
Uw = {U ∈ W | ∀U
′ ∈ W , U ⊆ U ′ ⇒ U = U ′}, i.e., the set of maximal winning ECs.
The intuition on why we can restrict our study to this subset is as follows. If an EC U1 ∈ W is included
in another EC U2 ∈ W , i.e., U1 ⊆ U2, we have that the maximal expected value achievable in U2 is at least
equal to the one achievable in U1. Indeed, P1 can reach U1 with probability one (by virtue of U2 being an EC
and U1 ⊆ U2) and stay in it forever with probability one (by virtue of U1 being an EC): hence the expectation
would be equal to what can be obtained in U1 thanks to the prefix-independence of the mean-payoff. This
property implies that it is sufficient to consider maximal winning ECs in our computations.
As for why we do it, observe that the complexity gain is critical. The number of winning ECs can be as
large as |W| ≤ |E| ≤ 2|S|, that is, exponential in the size of the input. Yet, the number of maximal winning
ECs is bounded by |Uw| ≤ |S| as they are disjoint by definition. Indeed, for any two winning ECs with a
non-empty intersection, their union also constitutes an EC, and is still winning because P1 can essentially
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stick to the EC of his choice. The computation of the set Uw is executed by a recursive subalgorithm calling
polynomially-many times an NP∩ coNP oracle solving the worst-case threshold problem. Roughly sketched,
this algorithm computes the maximal end-component decomposition of an MDP (in polynomial time [11]),
then checks for each EC U in the decomposition (their number is polynomial) if U is winning or not,
which requires a call to an NP∩ coNP oracle solving the worst-case threshold problem on the corresponding
subgame. If U is losing, it may still be the case that a sub-EC U ′ ( U is winning. Therefore we recurse on
the MDP reduced to U , where states from which P2 can win in U have been removed (they are a no-go
for P1). Hence the stack of calls is also at most polynomial.
Ensure reaching winning end-components. As discussed, under any arbitrary strategy of P1, states
visited infinitely often form an EC with probability one. Now, if we take a finite-memory strategy that
satisfies the BWC problem (Def. 1), we can precise this result and state that they form a winning EC
with probability one. Equivalently, we have that the probability that an outcome pi is such that Inf(pi) = U
for some U ∈ E \ W is zero. The equality is crucial. It may be the case, with non-zero probability, that
Inf(pi) = U ′ ( U for some U ′ ∈ W and U ∈ E \W (hence the recursive algorithm to compute Uw). It is clear
that P1 should not visit all the states of a losing EC forever, as then he would not be able to guarantee the
worst-case threshold inside the corresponding subgame (we show in Sect. 4.11 that with infinite memory,
there may still be some incentive to stay in a losing EC).
We denote Sneg = S \
⋃
U∈Uw
U the set of states that, with probability one, are only seen a finite number
of times when a BWC satisfying strategy is played, and call them negligible states.
Our ultimate goal here is to build a modified MDP P ′, sharing the same graph and ECs as P , such that a
classical optimal strategy for the expected value problem on P ′ will naturally avoid losing ECs and prescribe
which winning ECs are the most interesting to reach for a BWC strategy on the initial game G and MDP P .
Observe that the expected value obtained in P by any BWC satisfying strategy of P1 only depends on the
weights of edges involved in winning ECs, or equivalently, in maximal winning ECs (as the set of outcomes
that are not trapped in them has measure zero). Consequently, we build P ′ by modifying the weight function
of P (line 12): we keep the weights unchanged in edges that belong to some U ∈ Uw, and we put them to
zero everywhere else, i.e., on any edge involving a negligible state. Weight zero is taken because it is lower
than the expectation granted by winning ECs, which is strictly greater than zero by definition.
Reach the highest valued winning end-components. We compute the maximal expected mean-payoff
ν∗ that can be achieved by P1 in the MDP P ′, from the corresponding initial state (line 13). This computation
takes polynomial time and memoryless strategies suffice to achieve the maximal value [20].
As discussed before, such a strategy reaches an EC of P ′ with probability one. Basically, we build a
strategy that favors reaching ECs with high associated expectations in P ′. We argue that the ECs reached
with probability one by this strategy are necessarily winning ECs. Clearly, if a winning EC is reachable
instead of a losing one, it will be favored because of the weights definition in P ′ (expectation is strictly
higher in winning ECs). It remains to check if the set of winning ECs is reachable with probability one from
any state in S. That is the case because of the preprocessing. Indeed, we know that all states are winning
for the worst-case requirement. Clearly, from any state in A = S \
⋃
U∈E U , P1 cannot ensure to stay in A
(otherwise it would form an EC) and thus must be able to win the worst-case requirement from reached
ECs. Now for any state in B =
⋃
U∈E U \
⋃
U∈Uw
U , i.e., states in losing ECs and not in any sub-EC winning,
P1 cannot win the worst-case by staying in B, by definition of losing EC. Since we know P1 can ensure the
worst-case by hypothesis, he must be able to reach C =
⋃
U∈Uw
U from any state in B, as claimed.
Inside winning end-components. Based on that, winning ECs are reached with probability one. Let us
first consider what we can say about such ECs if we assume that E∆ = E, i.e., if the stochastic model
maps all possible edges to non-zero probabilities. We establish a finite-memory combined strategy of P1 that
ensures (i) worst-case satisfaction while yielding (ii) an expected value ε-close to the maximal expectation
inside the component. For two well-chosen parameters K,L ∈ N, it is informally defined as follows: in
phase (a), play a memoryless expected value optimal strategy for K steps and memorize Sum ∈ Z, the sum
of weights along these steps; in phase (b), if Sum > 0, go to (a), otherwise play a memoryless worst-case
optimal strategy for L steps, then go to (a). In phases (a), P1 tries to increase its expectation and approach
its optimal one, while in phase (b), he compensates, if needed, losses that occured in phase (a). The two
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memoryless strategies exist on the subgame induced by the EC: by definition of ECs, based on E∆, the
stochastic model of P2 will never be able to force leaving the EC against the combined strategy.
A key result of our paper is the existence of values for K and L such that (i) and (ii) are verified. We
see plays as sequences of periods, each starting with phase (a). First, for any K, it is possible to define
L(K) such that any period composed of phases (a) + (b) ensures a mean-payoff at least 1/(K + L) > 0.
Periods containing only phase (a) trivially induce a mean-payoff at least 1/K as they are not followed by
phase (b). Both rely on the weights being integers. As the length of any period is bounded by (K + L), the
inequality remains strict for the mean-payoff of any play, implying (i). Now, consider parameter K. Clearly,
when K → ∞, the expectation over a phase (a) tends to the optimal one. Nevertheless, phases (b) also
contribute to the overall expectation of the combined strategy, and (in general) lower it so that it is strictly
less than the optimal for any K,L ∈ N. Hence to prove (ii), we not only need that the probability of playing
phase (b) decreases when K increases, but also that it decreases faster than the increase of L, needed to
ensure (i), so that overall, the contribution of phases (b) tends to zero when K →∞. This is indeed the case
and is proved using results bounding the probability of observing a mean-payoff significantly (more than
some ε) different than the optimal expectation along a phase (a) of length K ∈ N: this probability decreases
exponentially when K increases [41,25] (related to the notions of Chernoff bounds and Hoeffding’s inequality
in MCs), while L only needs to be polynomial in K.
Now, consider what happens if E∆ ( E. Then, if P2 uses an arbitrary strategy, he can take edges of
probability zero, i.e., in E \E∆, either staying in the EC, or leaving it. In both cases, this must be taken into
account in order to satisfy Eq. (1) as it may involve dangerous weights (recall that zero-probability edges
are not considered when an EC is classified as winning or not). Fortunately, if this were to occur, P1 could
switch to a worst-case winning memoryless strategy, which exists in all states thanks to the preprocessing,
to preserve the worst-case requirement. Regarding the expected value (Eq. (2)), this has no impact as it
occurs with probability zero against λstoch2 . The strategy to follow in winning ECs hence adds this reaction
procedure to the combined strategy: we call it the witness-and-secure strategy.
Global strategy synthesis. In summary, (a) losing ECs should be avoided and will be by a strategy that
optimizes the expectation on the MDP P ′; (b) in winning ECs, P1 can obtain (ε-closely) the expectation of
the EC and ensure the worst-case threshold.
Hence, we finally compare the value ν∗ with the expected value threshold ν (line 14): (i) if it is strictly
higher, we conclude that there exists a finite-memory strategy satisfying the BWC problem, and (ii) if it is
not, we conclude that there does not exist such a strategy.
To prove (i), we establish a finite-memory strategy in G, called global strategy, of P1 that ensures a strictly
positive mean-payoff against an antagonistic adversary, and ensures an expected mean-payoff ε-close to ν∗
(hence > ν) against the stochastic adversary modeled by λstoch2 (i.e., in P ). The intuition is as follows. We
play the memoryless optimal strategy of the MDP P ′ for a sufficiently long time, defined by a parameter
N ∈ N, in order to be with probability close to one in a winning EC (the convergence is exponential by results
on absorption times in MCs [26]). Then, if we are inside a winning EC, we switch to the witness-and-secure
strategy which, as sketched in the previous paragraph, ensures the worst-case and the expectation thresholds.
If we are not yet in a winning EC, then we switch to a worst-case winning strategy in G, which always exists
by hypothesis. Thus the mean-payoff of plays that do not reach winning ECs is strictly positive. Since in
winning ECs we are ε-close to the maximal expected value of the EC, we can conclude that it is possible to
play the optimal expectation strategy of MDP P ′ for sufficiently long to obtain an overall expected value
which is arbitrarily close to ν∗, and still guarantee the worst-case threshold in all outcomes.
To prove (ii), it suffices to understand that only ECs have an impact on the expectation, and that losing
ECs cannot be used forever without endangering the worst-case requirement. Note that given a winning
strategy on G, it is possible to build a corresponding winning strategy on Gi by reintegrating the memory
elements of the Moore machine in the memory of the winning strategy of P1.
Complexity bounds. The input size of the algorithm depends on the size of the game, the size of the
Moore machine for the stochastic model, and the encodings of weights and thresholds. We can prove that all
computing steps require (deterministic) polynomial time except for calls to an oracle solving the worst-case
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threshold problem, which is in NP ∩ coNP [45,31] and not known to be in P. Hence, the overall complexity
of the BWC problem is NP∩ coNP and may collapse to P if the worst-case problem were to be proved in P.
We also establish that the BWC problem is at least as difficult as the worst-case problem thanks to a
polynomial time reduction from the latter to the former. Thus, BWC MP membership to NP ∩ coNP can
be seen as optimal regarding our current knowledge of the worst-case threshold problem.
Theorem 1. The beyond worst-case problem for the mean-payoff value function is in NP ∩ coNP and at
least as hard as deciding the winner in mean-payoff games.
Remark 1 (approximation of the optimal value). Given a worst-case threshold µ ∈ Q, a natural question is
whether we can maximize the expectation of finite-memory strategies that satisfy this threshold. However,
there is no best expectation value in general, as increasing the size of the memory may also strictly increase
the expectation. Nevertheless, the least upper bound of all the expected value thresholds that can be achieved
by finite-memory strategies can be approached up to an ε, for all ε > 0. Formally, assume that the worst-
case threshold µ can be satisfied, and let ν⊤ be the least upper bound of the set {ν ∈ Q | ∃λ1 ∈ ΛPF1 that
satisfies the BWC problem for thresholds (µ, ν)} (it exists since this set is trivially bounded by W and it
is non-empty). Without knowing ν⊤ a priori, it is still possible to approach it ε-closely, for all ε > 0, by
a dichotomic search with a polynomial (in V = log2W , the length of the encoding of weights) number of
steps, initialized to the interval [µ,W ].
4.2 Running example
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Fig. 2: Mean-payoff game with maximal winning ECs U2 and U3. End-component U1 is losing.
In order to illustrate several notions and strategies, we will consider the game depicted in Fig. 2 throughout
Sect. 4. States of P1 are represented by circles and states of P2 by squares. The stochastic model of P2 is
memoryless and is described by the probabilities written close to the start of outgoing edges. For example,
in s2, the stochastic model chooses edge (s2, s1) with probability 1/2 and edge (s2, s3) with probability 1/2.
Each edge is assigned a weight represented by an integer number midway. Formally, our definition of the
set E allows only one edge from any given state s to any state s′, hence asks that multiple edges with different
values be split by adding dummy states (states with exactly one ingoing edge and one outgoing edge). Note
that in order to preserve the same mean-payoff values for paths in the graph, we need to split every edge and
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copy its weight in both halfs. This restriction is w.l.o.g. and applied for the sake of readability in technical
proofs. Still, our graphical representation oversteps it to maintain compactness.
We consider the BWC problem with the worst-case threshold µ = 0. Observe that this game satisfies
the assumptions guaranteed at the end of the preprocessing part of the algorithm. That is, the worst-case
threshold is zero, a worst-case winning strategy of P1 exists in all states (e.g., the memoryless strategy
choosing edges (s1, s9), (s3, s5), (s6, s9), (s9, s10) and (s10, s9) in their respective starting states), and the
stochastic model is memoryless, as explained above.
4.3 Preprocessing - simplifying assumptions
We discuss here the preprocessing part of the algorithm (lines 1-10). The goal is to be able to execute the
main algorithm (lines 11-17) with the following hypotheses: (a) the worst-case threshold is zero, (b) in all
states, P1 has a strategy to satisfy the worst-case requirement, and (c) the stochastic model of the adversary
is memoryless. This preprocessing is sound and complete: P1 has a strategy for the BWC problem in the
input Gi (for thresholds (µi, νi) and against stochastic model λi2) if and only if he also has one in the
preprocessed game G (for thresholds (0, ν) and against stochastic model λstoch2 ). We break down the proof
in three lemmas, one for each hypothesis.
Thresholds. First, Lemma 2 states that the worst-case threshold can be taken equal to zero thanks to a
slight modification of the weight function (lines 1-2). From now on, we thus assume that µ = 0.
Lemma 2. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, sinit ∈ S the initial
state, λf2 ∈ Λ
F
2 a finite-memory stochastic model of P2, and (µ =
a
b
, ν) ∈ Q2 a pair of thresholds, with a ∈ Z
and b ∈ N0. Then P1 has a satisfying strategy for the BWC mean-payoff problem in G if and only if P1 has
a satisfying strategy when considering the thresholds pair (0, ν′ = b · ν − a) and the weight function w′ such
that ∀ e ∈ E, w′(e) = b · w(e)− a.
Proof. Recall the mean-payoff of a play is defined as the (infimum) limit of the mean weight over prefixes
of increasing length. Hence, the affine transformation applied on weights carries over to play values: for all
pi ∈ Plays(G), we have that MPw′(pi) = b ·MPw(pi)−a, where the subscript denotes which weight function we
consider. Let λ1 ∈ Λ1 be a strategy of P1. First, consider the worst-case requirement of Eq. (1). We claim
that the following equivalence holds: ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), MPw(pi) > µ =
a
b
⇐⇒ ∀λ2 ∈
Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), MPw′(pi) > 0. This is trivial by applying the affine transformation. Second,
consider the expected value requirement of Eq. (2). We claim that
E
G[λ1,λ
f
2
]
sinit (MPw) > ν ⇐⇒ E
G[λ1,λ
f
2
]
sinit (MPw′) > ν
′ = b · ν − a.
The expected value operator is well-known to be linear. Thus, by extracting the affine transformation, we
obtain that E
G[λ1,λ
f
2
]
sinit (MPw′) = b ·E
G[λ1,λ
f
2
]
sinit (MPw)− a, which proves our point and concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Worst-case winning. Second, we prove in Lemma 3 that a necessary condition for a strategy to satisfy
the BWC problem is to avoid visiting states that are losing for the worst-case mean-payoff requirement.
This justifies lines 3-7 of the algorithm. Observe that the graph of Gw = Gi ⇂ SWC contains no deadlock
as otherwise it would contradict the fact that P1 can satisfy the worst-case threshold problem from states
in SWC in the game G
i. Also note that Gw[λi2] remains a well-defined MDP as there exists no edge from
states s ∈ Si2 ∩ SWC to states s
′ ∈ S \ SWC, otherwise P2 could win the game from s by reaching s′, by
prefix-independence of the mean-payoff, and so s would no belong to SWC.
Lemma 3. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, sinit ∈ S the initial
state, λf2 ∈ Λ
F
2 a finite-memory stochastic model of P2, and ν ∈ Q the expected value threshold. Let SWC ⊆ S
be the set of winning states for P1 for the worst-case threshold problem. If λ1 ∈ Λ
F
1 is a satisfying strategy
for the BWC mean-payoff problem, then ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), ∀ s ∈ S \ SWC, s 6∈ pi.
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Proof. Formally, let SWC := {s ∈ S | ∃λ1 ∈ Λ1, ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(s, λ1, λ2), MP(pi) > 0}. We claim
that a winning strategy of P1 for the BWC problem must avoid states that are not in SWC and prove
it by contradiction. Indeed, let λ1 ∈ ΛF1 be such a strategy. Assume the claim is false: there exist λ2 ∈ Λ2,
pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2) and s ∈ S \ SWC such that s ∈ pi. By definition of SWC and determinacy of mean-
payoff games [19,35], it is the case that in state s, P2 has a winning strategy for the worst-case objective:
there exists λ′2 ∈ Λ2 such that for all λ
′
1 ∈ Λ1, there exists pi
′ ∈ OutsG(s, λ′1, λ
′
2) such that ¬(MP(pi
′) > 0),
i.e., MP(pi′) ≤ 0. Hence, consider the strategy λ′′2 of P2 that plays according to λ2 up to the first visit of s and
according to λ′2 afterwards. Clearly, there exists an outcome pi
′′ ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ′′2 ) such that pi
′′ = ρ · pi′
and MP(pi′) ≤ 0 for some ρ ∈ Prefs(G). Since the mean-payoff objective is prefix-independent, we have that
MP(pi′′) ≤ 0. Thus, the strategy λ1 of P1 does not satisfy Eq. (1), which contradicts the hypothesis and
concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Memoryless stochastic model. Finally, we show in Lemma 4 that we can study the equivalent BWC
problem on the game obtained by product of the original game and the Moore machine of the stochastic
model, using a memoryless stochastic model instead of the finite-memory one (lines 8-10 of BWC MP).
Having a memoryless stochastic model proves useful in the main steps of the algorithm (lines 11-17) as it
guarantees that the game G and the MDP G[λstoch2 ] possess the same underlying graph.
Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, sinit ∈ S the initial state,
λf2 ∈ Λ
F
2 (G) a finite-memory stochastic model of P2, M(λ
f
2 ) = (Mem,m0, αu, αn) its Moore machine. We
define the product game G′ = G⊗M(λf2 ) = (G
′, S′1, S
′
2), with G
′ = (S′, E′, w′), as follows.
– S′ = S ×Mem, S′1 = S1 ×Mem, S
′
2 = S2 ×Mem;
– ∀ s1, s2 ∈ S, ∀m1,m2 ∈ Mem, ((s1,m1), (s2,m2)) ∈ E′ ⇔ (s1, s2) ∈ E ∧ αu(m1, s1) = m2;
– ∀ e = ((s1,m1), (s2,m2)) ∈ E
′, w′(e) = w((s1, s2));
– s′init = (sinit,m0) is the new initial state.
Given the finite-memory stochastic model λf2 ∈ Λ
F
2 (G) of P2, we transcript it into a memoryless strategy
λm2 ∈ Λ
M
2 (G
′) on the product game such that ∀ s1 ∈ S2, ∀ ((s1,m1), (s2,m2)) ∈ E′, λm2 ((s1,m1))((s2,m2)) =
αn(m1, s1)(s2). Basically, we have integrated the finite memory of λ
f
2 into the states of G
′ and defined the
remaining corresponding memoryless strategy λm2 on G
′. The following lemma holds.
Lemma 4. Let ν ∈ Q be the expected value threshold. The two following statements are equivalent.
(a) P1 has a strategy to satisfy the BWC problem on G against the finite-memory stochastic model λ
f
2 .
(b) P1 has a strategy to satisfy the BWC problem on G′ against the memoryless stochastic model λm2 .
Proof. We first prove (a) ⇒ (b). Assume λ1 ∈ ΛF1 (G) is a satisfying strategy for the BWC problem on G, i.e.,
it satisfies Eq. (1) and (2) against the stochastic model λf2 . We build a corresponding strategy λ
′
1 ∈ Λ
F
1 (G
′)
that is winning against λm2 in G
′ as follows: ∀ ρ′ = (s0,m0)(s1,m1) . . . (sk,mk) ∈ Prefs1(G′), (sk+1,mk+1) ∈
S′ such that ((sk,mk), (sk+1,mk+1)) ∈ E′, λ′1(ρ
′) ((sk+1,mk+1)) = λ1(projS(ρ
′))(sk+1). Note that strategy
λ′1 is well-defined as λ1 is. Consider the worst-case requirement on G
′ (Eq. (1)). Let pi′ ∈ OutsG′(s′init, λ
′
1) be
any outcome consistent with the newly defined strategy λ′1. By definition of λ
′
1, we have that pi = projS(pi
′) ∈
OutsG(sinit, λ1) is an outcome consistent with λ1 in G. Hence, by hypothesis, we have that MP(pi) > 0.
By definition of w′, we have that MPw′(pi
′) = MPw(pi), thus MP(pi
′) > 0 and the worst-case requirement is
satisfied. Now consider the expected value, Eq. (2). By hypothesis, we have that E
G[λ1,λ
f
2
]
sinit (MP) > ν. We claim
that E
G′[λ′1,λ
m
2 ]
s′
init
(MP) > ν. Indeed, observe that there is a bijection between outcomes in Outs
G[λ1,λ
f
2
](sinit)
and OutsG′[λ′
1
,λm
2
](s
′
init) using the projection operator because the memory update function αu of the Moore
machineM(λf2 ) is deterministic. As the values of plays are preserved by the changes to w
′ and the probability
measures of cylinder sets are also preserved by definition of λm2 , the claim is verified.
Second, we show that (b)⇒ (a). Assume λ′1 ∈ Λ
F
1 (G
′) is a satisfying strategy for the BWC problem on G′,
against the stochastic model λm2 . We build a corresponding strategy λ1 ∈ Λ
F
1 (G) that is winning against λ
f
2
in G. Thanks to the update function ofM(λf2 ) being deterministic, given a prefix ρ = s0s1 . . . sk ∈ Prefs(G),
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there is a unique corresponding prefix ρ′ ∈ Prefs(G′) such that ρ = projS(ρ
′). Hence we define λ1 as follows:
∀ ρ = s0s1 . . . sk ∈ Prefs1(G), sk+1 ∈ S such that (sk, sk+1) ∈ E, λ1(ρ)(sk+1) = λ′1(ρ
′)((sk+1,mk+1)),
with ρ′ = (s0,m0)(s1,m1) . . . (sk,mk) the unique prefix in Prefs1(G
′) such that ρ = projS(ρ
′) and mk+1 =
αu(mk, sk). Strategy λ1 is well-defined. The rest follows by similar arguments as for (a)⇒ (b). ⊓⊔
Given a satisfying strategy in the product game, the proof of Lemma 4 describes how to obtain a corre-
sponding satisfying strategy in the original game. Hence, strategies obtained through algorithm BWC MP
are preserved alongside the answer to the BWC problem when going back to the original game. We now
study the main steps of the algorithm, assuming the simplifying assumptions given by the preprocessing.
4.4 Classification of end-components
In the following, we consider a game G where all states are winning for the worst-case requirement (Eq. (1)),
a memoryless stochastic model λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 , and P = G[λ
stoch
2 ], the MDP obtained when this stochastic
model is followed by P2. As sketched in Sect. 4.1, the crux is the analysis of the ECs of P .
Long-run appearance of end-components. Lemma 5 recalls a well-known property of MDPs: under any
arbitrary strategy of P1, the set of states visited infinitely often along a play almost-surely constitutes an
EC. Notice the abuse of notation as discussed in Sect. 2.
Lemma 5 ([14,16]). Let P = (G, S1, S∆, ∆) be an MDP, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, E ⊆ 2S the
set of its end-components, sinit ∈ S the initial state, and λ1 ∈ Λ1(P ) an arbitrary strategy of P1. Then, we
have that P
P [λ1]
sinit
(
{pi ∈ OutsP [λ1](sinit) | Inf(pi) ∈ E}
)
= 1.
Hence the expected value E
P [λ1]
sinit (MP) depends exclusively on the values of end-components (because the
mean-payoff of any play belongs to [−W,W ] and thus the value of plays not entering ECs, which set has
probability measure zero, cannot be infinite).
Winning end-components. First, we introduce some notations. We respectively denote G∆ and P∆ the
game and MDP where the underlying graph is limited to the subset of edges which are assigned non-zero
probability by ∆ = λstoch2 , i.e., E∆ ⊆ E. By definition, ECs are computed with regard to E∆, hence the
ECs of P∆ are exactly equal to the ECs of P . Moreover, we have that Λ2(G∆) =
{
λ2 ∈ Λ2(G) | ∀ ρ · s ∈
Prefs2(G), Supp(λ2(ρ · s)) ⊆ Supp(∆(s))
}
, whereas available choices are unchanged for P1 in G∆ as edges in
E \E∆ all start in states of P2.
Using these notations, we now define winning ECs as the ECs U ∈ E where P1 can ensure satisfaction
of the worst-case requirement in the corresponding subgame G∆ ⇂ U . Note that we consider G∆ as we only
need to consider strategies of P2 that share the support of the stochastic model. That is because our goal
is to ensure that P1 can benefit from (the maximal expectation achievable in) these ECs, which is only safe
with regard to the worst-case requirement if P1 can force that all outcomes that may occur when facing the
stochastic model yield a strictly positive mean-payoff. Note that reacting to an arbitrary strategy of P2, i.e.,
a strategy in Λ2(G), as required in Eq. (1), will be considered in the following sections: for now we only care
about λstoch2 and satisfaction of the expected value requirement as specified in Eq. (2).
Definition 2. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, λ
stoch
2 ∈ Λ
M
2 a
memoryless stochastic model of P2, P = G[λstoch2 ] = (G, S1, S∆ = S2, ∆ = λ
stoch
2 ) the resulting MDP and G∆
the game reduced to non-zero probability edges. Let U ∈ E be an end-component of P . Then, we have that
– U ∈ W , the winning ECs, if the following holds: ∃λ1 ∈ Λ1(G∆ ⇂ U), ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2(G∆ ⇂ U), ∀ s ∈ U, ∀pi ∈
Outs(G∆⇂U)(s, λ1, λ2), MP(pi) > 0 ;
– U ∈ L, the losing ECs, otherwise. By determinacy of mean-payoff games, ∃λ2 ∈ Λ2(G∆ ⇂ U), ∀λ1 ∈
Λ1(G∆ ⇂ U), ∃ s ∈ U, ∃pi ∈ Outs(G∆⇂U)(s, λ1, λ2), MP(pi) ≤ 0.
Note that an EC is winning if P1 has a worst-case winning strategy from all states. This point is important
as it may well be the case that winning strategies exist in a strict subset of states of the EC. This does
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not contradict the definition of ECs as strongly connected subgraphs, as the latter only guarantees that
every state can be reached with probability one, and not necessarily surely. Hence one cannot call upon the
prefix-independence of the mean-payoff to extend the existence of a winning strategy to all states. Such a
situation can be observed on the game of Fig. 3, where the EC U2 is losing (because from s1, the outcome
(s1s3s4)
ω can be forced by P2, yielding mean-payoff −1/3 ≤ 0), while its sub-EC U3 is winning. From s1,
P1 can ensure to reach U3 almost-surely, but not surely, which is critical in this case.
s1 s2
s3 s4
s5
U3
U2 U1
1
2
1
2
00
0 −1
0
10 1
0
Fig. 3: End component U2 is losing. The set of maximal winning ECs is Uw =W = {U1, U3}.
Maximality. As discussed in Sect. 4.1, we can restrict our analysis to maximal winning ECs in the following.
This is a consequence of Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let U1, U2 ∈ W be two winning ECs in the MDP P such that U1 ( U2. Let ν∗1 , ν
∗
2 denote the
respective maximal expected values achievable by P1 in U1 and U2. Then, we have that ν∗1 ≤ ν
∗
2 .
Proof. First notice that the maximal expectation achievable in an EC does not depend on the starting state
inside the EC. Hence, assume any state s2 ∈ U2. Since U1 ( U2 and U2 is an end-component, P1 can reach
a state in U1 with probability one from s2. Hence, the contribution of plays that do not reach U1 in the
expected value is null. Finally, by prefix-independence of the mean-payoff, we can forget about the finite
prefixes outside U1 and we deduce that ν
∗
2 ≥ ν
∗
1 . ⊓⊔
We formally define the set of maximal winning ECs as Uw = {U ∈ W | ∀U ′ ∈ W , U ⊆ U ′ ⇒ U = U ′}.
While the total number of winning ECs |W| ≤ |E| ≤ 2|S| can be exponential in the number of states of the
game, the number of maximal winning ECs |Uw| ≤ |S| is bounded by this number of states, as all ECs of Uw
are disjoint (because the union of two winning ECs is itself a winning EC). Hence, restriction to the maximal
winning ECs is a cornerstone in the overall NP ∩ coNP complexity that we claim for the BWC problem.
Illustration. Consider the running example in Fig. 2. Note that states s1, s2 and s5 do not belong to any
EC: given any strategy of P1 in P , with probability one, any consistent outcome will only visit those states
a finite number of times (Lemma 5). The set of maximal winning ECs is Uw = {U2, U3}. Obviously, those
ECs are disjoint. The set of winning ECs is larger, W = Uw ∪ {{s9, s10}, {s6, s7}}.
End-component U1 is losing. Indeed, in the subgame G∆ ⇂ U1, the strategy consisting in always picking
the −1 edge guarantees an outcome which mean-payoff is negative. Note that this edge is present in E∆
as it is assigned probability 1/2 by the stochastic model. Here, we witness why it is important to base our
definition of winning ECs on the game G∆ rather than G. Indeed, in G ⇂ U2, P2 can also guarantee a negative
mean-payoff by always choosing edges with weight −1. However, to achieve this, P2 has to pick edges that
are not in E∆: this will never happen against the stochastic model and as such, this can be watched by P1
to see if P2 uses an arbitrary antagonistic strategy, and dealt with. If P2 conforms to E∆, i.e., if he plays in
G∆, he has to pick the edge of weight 1 in s7 and P1 has a worst-case winning strategy consisting in always
choosing to go in s7. This EC is thus classified as winning. Note that for U3, in both subgames G ⇂ U3 and
G∆ ⇂ U3, P1 can guarantee a strictly positive mean-payoff by playing (s9 s10)ω: even arbitrary strategies of
P2 cannot endanger P1 in this case.
Lastly, consider the game depicted in Fig. 3. While U2 is a strict superset of U3, the former is losing
whereas the latter is winning, as explained above. Hence, the set Uw is equal to {U1, U3}.
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Algorithm 2 MWEC(P )
Input: P = (G, S1, S∆,∆), with G = (S,E,w) such that E∆ = E
Output: Mw = Uw, the set of maximal winning ECs of P
1: if S = ∅ then
2: return ∅
3: else
4: Compute Mw := {U1, . . . , Un} the maximal EC decomposition of P
5: for all i = 1, . . . , n do
6: Compute Li ⊆ Ui the set of states from which P2 has a strategy to enforce MP ≤ 0 in P ⇂ Ui, i.e.,
Li := {s ∈ Ui | ∀λ1 ∈ Λ1(P ⇂ Ui), ∃pi ∈ OutsP ⇂Ui(s, λ1), MP(pi) ≤ 0}
7: if Li 6= ∅ then
8: Mw := (Mw \ {Ui}) ∪MWEC(P ⇂ (Ui \ Li))
9: return Mw
Computation of the maximal winning end-components. Obviously, from a complexity standpoint,
to benefit from the polynomial size of Uw, in contrast to the potentially exponential size of W , we need to
compute Uw without first computing all winning ECs ofW . We present an algorithm to do so, calledMWEC,
in Alg. 2. Lemma 7 establishes that MWEC is correct and complete, and uses a polynomial number of calls
to an NP ∩ coNP oracle to solve mean-payoff games (i.e., decide the answer of the worst-case threshold
problem), other than that implementing polynomial operations. It operates under the assumption that all
edges are of non-zero probability, i.e., E∆ = E. This is w.l.o.g. as it suffices to remove those edges as a
preprocessing step (they have no impact in the definitions of ECs and winning ECs).
Lemma 7. Let P = (G, S1, S∆, ∆) be an MDP, with G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph such that E∆ = E.
Then algorithm MWEC computes its set of maximal winning ECs Uw = MWEC(P ) in polynomially-many
calls to an NP ∩ coNP oracle for mean-payoff games.
Algorithm MWEC can be sketched as follows. Given a non-empty MDP (S 6= ∅), it first computes its
decomposition into maximal end-components5 (without distinction between winning and losing ECs). This
can be obtained in polynomial time [11]. Afterwards, it checks for each of these ECs if it is winning or not, in
the sense of Def. 2. If the EC is winning, it is now part of the set of claimed maximal winning ECs, denoted
Mw in the algorithm, and the algorithm will not recurse on this set of states. If the EC is losing, then it
may still be the case that a sub-EC is winning, as discussed in Sect. 4.4. Hence, the algorithm eliminates all
worst-case losing states and executes recursively on the induced sub-MDP. It stops recursing on sub-MDPs
whenever one is declared winning or empty. Since it suppresses at least one state in each call, the algorithm
is ensured to stop. Moreover, the number of calls is polynomial in the size of the MDP. Deciding if an EC is
winning or losing requires calling an NP ∩ coNP oracle solving the worst-case threshold problem [45,31,23].
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of the correctness and completeness of the algo-
rithm, as well as an illustration of its operation. We first state several remarks on its functioning.
Remark 2. In line 6, we have that P ⇂ Ui is a well-defined MDP, since Ui is an EC. Similarly, in line 8,
P ⇂ (Ui \Li) is also a well-defined MDP. Indeed, from all states s ∈ (Ui \Li)∩ S1, there exists an edge from
s that goes to a state of Ui \ Li, otherwise s would be a losing state (and so would be in Li). Moreover, for
all states s ∈ (Ui \ Li) ∩ S∆, there is no edge from s that goes in Li (otherwise s would be in Li) nor in
S \Ui (otherwise U would not be an EC), and therefore the probability distribution ∆(s) is still well-defined
on P ⇂ (Ui \ Li). Additionally, this sub-MDP still verifies that there is no edge with probability zero.
5 Given an MDP P with a set of ECs E , an EC U is said to be maximal in P if for all U ′ ∈ E , U ⊆ U ′ ⇒ U = U ′.
This is not to be confused with the definition of maximal winning ECs, given in this section. In particular, maximal
ECs need not be winning in general, whereas maximal winning ECs need not be maximal ECs in the sense we just
defined (they only need to be maximal with regard to other winning ECs).
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Remark 3. Let U be an EC of P , L its set of losing states (as computed by line 6), and V ⊆ U \L. Then V
is a winning EC of P ⇂ (U \ L) if and only if V is a winning EC of P . This follows from the same reasoning
as for Rem. 2.
Remark 4. Let U be a winning EC of P , strictly included in a losing EC V of P . Let s ∈ V be a worst-case
losing state (i.e., a state from which P1 cannot guarantee a strictly positive mean-payoff in P ⇂ V , as defined
at line 6 of the algorithm). Then we claim that s 6∈ U . Indeed, suppose the contrary. From s, P2 can enforce
MP ≤ 0 against any strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1(P ⇂ V ), and a fortiori could do so against any strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1(P ⇂ U)
(notice that only P1 can decide to leave U as U is an EC). Therefore, U would not be winning.
Proof. We first show that the algorithm is sound, i.e., Mw ⊆ Uw. It is done by induction on the size of P . If
P is empty (S = ∅), the claim is clear. Otherwise let U ∈ Mw. There are two cases. (I) U is equal to some Ui
computed at line 4 and has never been removed from Mw. It means that Li is empty, and by definition of Li,
that Ui is winning. Also, Ui is trivially a maximal winning EC as it belongs to the maximal EC decomposition
of P . (II) U has been added at line 8 as the result of some recursive call MWEC(P ⇂ (Ui \ Li)) for some
maximal EC Ui of P . Since Li 6= ∅, the set Ui \ Li is strictly smaller than S, and by induction hypothesis,
U is a winning EC of P ⇂ (Ui \ Li). By Rem. 3, it is also a winning EC of P . It remains to show that U
is a maximal winning EC of P . Suppose that it is not the case. Then there exists a strict superset U ′ of
U which is a winning EC of P . Clearly, U ′ ⊆ Ui since Ui is a maximal EC of P , and maximal ECs are
pairwise disjoint. Morevoer, U ′ is a subset of Ui \ Li by Rem. 4. By Rem. 3, it is therefore a winning EC of
P ⇂ (Ui \ Li), which contradicts the maximality of U in P ⇂ (Ui \ Li).
We now establish that the algorithm is complete, i.e., Uw ⊆ Mw. Again, it is proved by induction on
the size of P . If P is empty, then the claim is obviously true. Now, suppose that P is non-empty, and let
U ∈ Uw. There are two cases. (I) U is a maximal EC of P . In that case, it will be computed at line 4 and
never removed from Mw (because the set of losing states will be empty as U is winning). (II) U is not a
maximal EC in P . Therefore there exists some maximal EC Ui of P , which is losing and strictly contains U .
Let Li be the non-empty set of worst-case losing states of Ui (as computed by line 6). We have to show that
U is a maximal winning EC of P ⇂ (Ui \ Li), in which case we could conclude by induction hypothesis, i.e.,
U would be returned by the recursive call MWEC(P ⇂ (Ui \ Li)). By Rem. 4, U and Li are disjoint, and
therefore U ⊆ (Ui \Li). By Rem. 2 and Rem. 3, U is a winning EC of P ⇂ (Ui \Li), since it is a winning EC
of P . It remains to show that U is a maximal winning EC of P ⇂ (Ui \Li). Suppose that there exists a strict
superset U ′ of U such that U ′ is a winning EC of P ⇂ (Ui \ Li). By Rem. 3, U
′ would also be a winning EC
of P , which contradicts that U ∈ Uw by definition of Uw as the set of maximal winning ECs. It implies that
U is a maximal winning EC of P ⇂ (Ui \ Li) and thus that U ∈Mw.
Finally, consider the complexity. Assume that we have an NP ∩ coNP oracle solving the worst-case
threshold problem [45,31,23] and called in line 6. The number of recursive calls to MWEC is linear in |S|,
the number of states of P , because in the loop of line 5, the sets Ui are pairwise disjoint, and because each
call is executed after eliminating at least one state. Moreover, the maximal EC decomposition of P can be
computed in O(|S|2) [11]. Therefore, algorithmMWEC makes a polynomial number of calls to an NP∩coNP
oracle, which proves the claim. ⊓⊔
Consider the execution of algorithm MWEC on the MDP described in Fig. 3. In its first call, it computes
the maximal EC decompositionMw = {U1, U2}. Now, for U1, we have that L1 is empty and thus U1 remains
in Mw. On the contrary, for U2, we have that L2 = {s1, s3, s4}. Hence the algorithm suppresses U2 from
Mw and recurses on the sub-MDP P ⇂ (U2 \ L2) = P ⇂ {s5}. There, the maximal EC decomposition gives
the unique EC U3 which is winning since L3 = ∅, and thus remains in Mw. The algorithm ends with
Mw = {U1, U3}. Clearly we have that Mw = Uw as proved before.
4.5 Winning end-components are almost-surely reached in the long-run
Recall that Lemma 5 states that under any arbitrary strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1, the set of infinitely visited states
of the outcome of the MDP P [λ1] = G[λ1, λ
stoch
2 ] is almost-surely equal to an EC. In this section, we refine
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this result and show that under any finite-memory strategy λf1 ∈ Λ
F
1 satisfying the BWC problem, the set of
infinitely visited states is almost-surely equal to a winning EC. In other words, the long-run probability of
negligible states, defined as Sneg = S \
⋃
U∈Uw
U = S \
⋃
U∈W U , is zero.
Lemma 8. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 a
memoryless stochastic model of P2, P = G[λstoch2 ] the resulting MDP and sinit ∈ S the initial state. Let
λf1 ∈ Λ
F
1 be a finite-memory strategy of P1 that satisfies the BWC problem for thresholds (0, ν) ∈ Q
2. Then,
we have that P
P [λf
1
]
sinit
({
pi ∈ Outs
P [λf
1
](sinit) | Inf(pi) ∈ W
})
= 1.
Proof. Let λf1 ∈ Λ
F
1 be a finite-memory BWC satisfying strategy. By Lemma 5, we have the claim is verified
for U ∈ E =W∪L. It remains to show that the probability of having a losing EC, i.e., an EC in L, is zero. By
contradiction, assume there exists some Ul ∈ L such that P
P [λf
1
]
sinit
({
pi ∈ Outs
P [λf
1
](sinit) | Inf(pi) = Ul
})
> 0.
Since λf1 is finite-memory, we have that M = P [λ
f
1 ] is a finite MC. Thus, we consider the bottom strongly-
connected components (BSCCs) of M and the contradiction hypothesis implies that some outcomes of
OutsM (sinit) will be trapped in a BSCC corresponding to Ul (i.e., this BSCC is reachable with non-zero
probability in M), and visit all its states infinitely often. Since Ul is losing, this BSCC induces plays where
the mean-payoff is not strictly positive. Indeed, strategy λstoch2 of P2 suffices to produce consistent outcomes
that are worst-case losing thanks to Def. 2 (as only the support matters for the worst-case requirement, not
the exact probabilities). By prefix-independence of the mean-payoff value function, we obtain the existence
of plays of M , starting in sinit, and inducing a mean-payoff that does not satisfy the worst-case threshold.
This shows that λf1 is not winning for the BWC problem and by contradiction, concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
The consequence of this statement is that edges involving negligible states do not contribute to the overall
expectation of finite-memory strategies satisfying the BWC problem. Based on this, we propose in Sect. 4.8
a modification of the MDP P = G[λstoch2 ] that helps us synthesize satisfying strategies when they exist.
Remark 5. The proof of Lemma 8 relies on the finite memory of the strategy. Similar reasoning cannot be
applied if the strategy of P1 uses infinite memory. Indeed, the Markov chain M = P [λ
f
1 ] becomes infinite
and we cannot base our analysis on BSCCs anymore (as they need not exist in general, outcomes cannot
be trapped in a BSCC). As a matter of fact, we prove in Sect. 4.11 that infinite-memory strategies may
benefit from negligible states forming losing ECs in some cases, by staying in them forever with a non-zero
probability, and thus it is not possible to neglect them in the overall expectation.
Illustration. Consider U1 on Fig. 2. By Def. 2, this EC is losing as always taking the edge of weight −1
is a winning strategy for P2 in G∆ ⇂ U1. The optimal expectation achievable in P ⇂ U1 by P1 is 4: this is
higher than what is achievable in both U2 and U3. Note that there exists no winning EC included in U1.
By Lemma 5, we know that any strategy of P1 will see its expectation bounded by the maximum between
the optimal expectations of the ECs U1, U2 and U3. Lemma 8 further refines this bound by restricting it
to the maximum between the expectations of U2 and U3. Indeed, it states that P1 cannot benefit from the
expected value of U1 while using finite memory, as being trapped in U1 with non-zero probability induces
the existence of outcomes losing for the worst-case (here, outcomes that always take the −1 edge). Since U1
neither helps for the worst-case nor for the expectation, there is no point in playing inside it and P1 may
as well cross it directly and try to maximize its expectation using the winning ECs, U2 and U3. The set of
negligible states in P is Sneg = S \ (U2 ∪ U3) = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}.
In the game depicted in Fig. 3, we already observed that E = {U1, U2, U3}, W = Uw = {U1, U3} and
L = {U2}. Consider the negligible state s1 ∈ Sneg = U2 \ U3. As a consequence of Lemma 8, we have that a
finite-memory strategy of P1 may only take the edge (s1, s3) finitely often in order to ensure the worst-case
requirement. Indeed, the losing outcome (s1s3s4)
ω would exist (while of probability zero) if P1 were to play
this edge infinitely often. Therefore, it is clear that P1 can only ensure that U3 is reached with a probability
arbitrarily close to one, and not equal to one, because at some point, he has to switch to edge (s1, s2) (after
a bounded time since P1 uses a finite-memory strategy).
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4.6 Winning end-component with non-zero probabilities: combined strategy
In this section, we take a closer look at what happens inside a winning EC where the stochastic model
assigns non-zero probabilities to all possible edges. We will show how to deal with edges of probability zero
in Sect. 4.7. For the sake of readability, we make Assumption 1. Obviously, similar reasoning can be applied
to all the such winning ECs in a larger game.
Assumption 1. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2
a memoryless stochastic model of P2, and P = G[λstoch2 ] = (G, S1, S∆ = S2, ∆ = λ
stoch
2 ) the resulting MDP.
We assume that G is reduced to a unique maximal winning EC, i.e., Uw = {S}, and that G∆ = G, i.e., the
set of edges of probability zero, E \ E∆, is empty.
Our claim is that inside such a winning EC, P1 has a finite-memory strategy that simultaneously (a)
ensures the worst-case requirement, and (b) yields an expected value which is ε-close to the maximal expec-
tation of the EC. Consequently, we establish Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
Theorem 2. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game reduced to a unique winning EC, G = (S,E,w) its
underlying graph, λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 a memoryless stochastic model of P2 such that E∆ = E, P = G[λ
stoch
2 ] =
(G, S1, S∆ = S2, ∆ = λstoch2 ) the resulting MDP, sinit ∈ S an initial state and ν
∗ ∈ Q the maximal expected
value achievable by P1 in P . Then, for all ε > 0, there exists a finite-memory strategy of P1 that satisfies
the BWC problem for the thresholds pair (0, ν∗ − ε).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of Thm. 2. It is a remarkably positive result as
it essentially states that P1 can guarantee both the worst-case and the expected value thresholds without
sacrifying any performance (in terms of play values) except for some arbitrarily small ε. The key idea
is to build a finite-memory strategy based on careful alternation between two memoryless strategies: one
which is optimal for the worst-case, and one which is optimal for the expected value. The proof requires
deep understanding of the limiting properties of Markov chains, such as the rate of convergence towards a
stationary distribution. Nevertheless, we provide an intuitive sketch of the combined strategy and illustrate
it on the running example in the following.
Corollary 1. In a game G reduced to a winning EC, P1 has a strategy for the BWC problem for thresholds
(0, ν) against a stochastic model λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 such that E∆ = E if and only if the optimal expected value in
G[λstoch2 ] is strictly greater than ν.
Proof. Consider the left-to-right implication. Assume λ1 is the BWC strategy. By definition, the optimal
expected value ν∗ is at least equal to E
P [λ1]
sinit (MP), which is strictly greater than ν by hypothesis. Now consider
the converse implication. Let ν∗ be the optimal expected value. By hypothesis, ν∗ > ν. By Thm. 2, for any
ε > 0, there exists a strategy λ1 ∈ ΛF1 that satisfies the BWC problem for thresholds (0, ν
∗−ε). In particular,
it is possible to choose ε ≤ ν∗ − ν to obtain the claim and conclude the proof. ⊓⊔
Individual requirements - memoryless strategies. First, consider the two requirements - worst-case
and expected value - independently. By definition of winning ECs and the hypothesis that G = G∆, P1 has
a strategy to guarantee a strictly positive mean-payoff against any strategy of the adversary in the game.
As discussed in Sect. 2, pure memoryless optimal strategies exist for P1 [33,19]. In the following, we denote
λwc1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 such a strategy, and µ
∗ the optimal mean-payoff value, i.e., the minimal mean-payoff that λwc1
ensures against any strategy of P2. Hence, we have that µ∗ = infλ′
2
∈Λ2 {MP(pi) | pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
wc
1 , λ
′
2)} =
supλ1∈Λ1 infλ′2∈Λ2 {MP(pi) | pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ
′
2)} > 0, since we are in a winning EC for µ = 0.
Similarly, we define a pure memoryless strategy maximizing the expected value in the MDP P = G[λstoch2 ]
induced by applying the memoryless stochastic model λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 on G. We denote this strategy λ
e
1 ∈
ΛPM1 , and we write the associated expectation as ν
∗ = E
P [λe1]
sinit (MP). Notice that we manipulate equivalently
strategies on the game and on the MDP thanks to their shared underlying graph (Sect. 4.3). The existence
of a pure memoryless optimal strategy follows from [20] (see Sect. 2). However, we here require, without loss
of generality, that λe1 is chosen (there may exist several pure memoryless optimal strategies, all yielding the
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same expected value, by definition) in order to satisfy an additional property: we want that the Markov
chain P [λe1] be unichain, i.e., containing a unique recurrent class (i.e., a unique bottom strongly-connected
component when considering edges which are assigned non-zero probability in the MC), and possibly some
transient states. This will be useful later to apply needed technical results (Lemma 9). It is always possible
to choose such a strategy. Intuitively, P2 cannot force the existence of multiple recurrent classes in the MC
as it would contradict the fact that we are inside an EC (by definition, P1 must be able to force the visit
of any state with probability one). Hence, it remains to argue that P1 has no interest in inducing multiple
recurrent classes, as he cannot increase the expected value by doing so. This is clear since either the different
recurrent classes yield the same expectation, in which case one suffices, or they yield different expectations,
in which case an optimal strategy like λe1 will only use the one that produces the maximal expectation (P1
has the power to restrict the MC to the class of his choice by definition of EC).
In general, one cannot satisfy the BWC problem by following only λwc1 or only λ
e
1, although they suffice
when their respective requirements are considered independently. Fortunately, it is possible to build upon
those two strategies in order to achieve simultaneous satisfaction with a combined finite-memory strategy.
Defining a combined strategy. Based on the existence of strategies λwc1 and λ
e
1, we define a pure finite-
memory strategy λcmb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 that carefully and dynamically alternates between the two memoryless ones
to ensure satisfaction of the BWC problem. Our strategy is parameterized by two naturals : K and L.
Definition 3. In a game G satisfying Assumption 1, we define the combined strategy λcmb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 as
follows.
(a) Play λe1 for K steps and memorize Sum ∈ Z, the sum of weights encountered during these K steps.
(b) If Sum > 0, then go to (a).
Else, play λwc1 during L steps then go to (a).
By step we mean taking any edge in the game, be it from a state of P1 or P2. We define periods as
sequences played from the beginning of a phase of type (a) or (b) up to its end, i.e., the beginning of
a new period. Intuitively, in a period of type (a), the strategy mimics the optimal expectation strategy.
By playing λe1 long enough, we can ensure that the mean-payoff obtained during the period is very close
to ν∗, with probability close to one (Lemma 9). Still, we need to ensure the worst-case threshold in all
cases. This may in general not be ensured by periods of type (a). Hence, we keep a memory of the running
sum of weights in the period. This requires a finite number of bits of memory as the sum takes values in
{−K ·W,−K ·W + 1, . . . ,K ·W − 1,K ·W}. If Sum > 0 after the K steps, then the mean-payoff over the
period satisfies the worst-case requirement (Eq. (1)) and the strategy can immediately start a new period
of type (a). Otherwise, it is necessary to compensate in order to satisfy the worst-case requirement. In that
case, the strategy mimics the optimal worst-case strategy λwc1 for L steps. Such a strategy guarantees that
cycles in the outcome have a strictly positive sum of weights since µ∗ > 0, as discussed before. As Sum is
lower bounded after K steps, there exists a value of L such that the total sum of weights (and thus the
mean-payoff) over periods (a) + (b) is strictly positive. Because all weights are integers, we further deduce
that the sum over a period is at least equal to one. By the boundedness of the length of a period, we thus
prove that the overall mean-payoff along a play stays strictly positive. Hence λcmb1 satisfies Eq. (1).
While this sketch is sufficient to see that the worst-case requirement is satisfied by strategy λcmb1 , proving
that we can choose K and L such that its expected value is ε-close to ν∗ is more involved. Intuitively, periods
of type (b) must not happen too frequently, nor be too long, in order to have a boundable impact on the
overall expectation. The cornerstone to achieve such a moderate impact of periods of type (b) resides in
the fact that a linear increase in K produces an exponential decrease in the need for a period of type (b)
(Lemma 9) whereas it only requires a linear increase in L to ensure the worst-case requirement (see Def. 4 and
Lemma 10). Note that the need for a decreasing contribution of periods of type (b) to the overall expectation
explains why we need to track the current sum Sum and cannot settle for a simpler strategy that would play
periods (a) and (b) in strict alternation (cf. Rem. 7).
In a nutshell, we claim that under Assumption 1, it is always possible to find values for constants K
and L such that strategy λcmb1 satisfies the BWC problem for (0, ν
∗ − ε), as stated in Theorem 2. Before
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proving it, we illustrate the combined strategy and introduce some intermediary technical results. Notice
that implementing λcmb1 only requires finite memory as strategies λ
e
1 and λ
wc
1 are memoryless, constants K
and L have finite values, and Sum takes a finite number of values.
Illustration. Consider the subgame G∆ ⇂ U3 = G ⇂ U3 of the game in Fig. 2 and the initial state sinit = s10.
The worst-case requirement can be satisfied, that is why the EC is winning. Indeed, always choosing to go to
s9 when in s10 is an optimal memoryless worst-case strategy λ
wc
1 that guarantees a mean-payoff µ
∗ = 1. Its
expectation is E
G[λwc1 ,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = 1. On the other hand, the strategy λ
e
1 that always selects s11 is optimal
regarding the expected value criterion: it induces expectation6 ν∗ =
(
0+
(
1/2 ·9+1/2 · (−1)
))
/2 = 2 against
the stochastic model λstoch2 . However, it can only guarantee a mean-payoff of value −1/2 in the worst-case.
s10
Sum > 0
s11
s10
Sum ≤ 0
s9
1
2
1
2
0
−1
1
1
9
Fig. 4: Markov chain G[λcmb1 , λ
stoch
2 ] in-
duced by the combined strategy λcmb1
and the stochastic model λstoch2 over the
winning EC U3 of G.
By Theorem 2, we know that it is possible to find finite-memory
strategies satisfying the BWC problem for any thresholds pair
(0, 2−ε), ε > 0. In particular, consider the thresholds pair (0, 3/2).
We build a combined strategy λcmb1 as described in Def. 3. Let
K = L = 2: the strategy plays the edge (s10, s11) once, then if
the edge of value 9 has been chosen by P2, it chooses (s10, s11)
again; otherwise it chooses the edge (s10, s9) once and then re-
sumes choosing (s10, s11). This strategy satisfies the BWC prob-
lem. In the worst-case, P2 always chooses the −1 edge, but each
time he does so, the −1 is followed by two +1 thanks to the cycle
s10s9s10. Strategy λ
cmb
1 hence guarantees a mean-payoff equal to
(0−1+1+1)/4 = 1/4 > 0 in the worst-case. For the expected value
requirement, we can build the Markov chain G[λcmb1 , λ
stoch
2 ] (Fig. 4)
and check that its expectation is E
G[λcmb1 ,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = 5/3 > 3/2.
Remark 6. Memoryless strategies do not suffice for the BWC prob-
lem, even with randomization. Indeed, the edge (s10, s11) cannot be
assigned a non-zero probability as it would endanger the worst-case requirement (since the outcome (s10s11)
ω
cycling on the edge of weight −1 would exist and have a negative mean-payoff). Hence, the only acceptable
memoryless strategy is λwc1 , which has only an expectation of 1.
Technical results. Before proving the correctness of strategy λcmb1 , we introduce an important property
verified by the MC G[λe1, λ
stoch
2 ]. It is known that in the long-run, the probability of outcomes that induce a
mean-payoff equal to the expectation of the MC is one. Lemma 9 shows that, for sufficiently long prefixes, it
is possible to bound the probability of having a mean-payoff which differs from the expected value by more
than a given ε > 0. In particular, it implies that for sufficiently large values of K, this probability decreases
exponentially with K. This will help us bound the impact of periods of type (b) on the overall expectation.
Lemma 9 (Follows from the extension of [25, Thm. 2] proposed in [41]). For all initial state sinit,
for all ε > 0, there exists constants c1, c2 > 0 and K0 ∈ N such that, for all K ≥ K0,
P
G[λe1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit
(
pi ∈ Plays(G[λe1, λ
stoch
2 ])
∣∣∣ ∣∣MP(pi(K))− ν∗∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ F(K, ε) = c1
ec2·K·ε2
.
In [25, Thm. 2], Glynn and Ormoneit present an extension of Hoeffding’s inequality [28] for uniformly ergodic
Markov chains. Straight application of this result in our setting is not possible, as the MC G[λe1, λ
stoch
2 ] does
not need to be aperiodic in general. Nevertheless, this result is extended to unichain MCs (possibly periodic)
in [41]. Hence, Lemma 9 reformulates the latter result in our precise context. Notice that the MC G[λe1, λ
stoch
2 ]
is unichain thanks to the choice of λe1, as presented earlier.
6 Given an irreducible MC M = (G, δ), with G = (S,E,w), one can compute its limiting stationary distribution
by finding the unique probability vector v ∈ [0, 1]|S| such that vPδ = v, where Pδ denotes the transition matrix
derived from δ. The expected mean-payoff can then be obtained by multiplying the row vector v by the column
vector e ∈ R|S| that contains the respective expected weights over outgoing edges for each state. That is: ∀ s ∈ S,
e(s) =
∑
s′∈S δ(s)(s
′) · w((s, s′)), and EMs = v · e.
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Proof. For the sake of completeness, we sketch the main steps proposed by Tracol [41] to extend the results
of [25]. Consider the MC G[λe1, λ
stoch
2 ]: it can be decomposed in a set of transient states and a unique recurrent
class, i.e., a bottom strongly-connected component. Assume this BSCC is periodic, of period d ∈ N0. We can
decompose it in d aperiodic classes on which we are able to apply the bound provided by [25, Thm. 2]. The
key idea is then to obtain a unified bound by aggregating the bounds obtained for each aperiodic MC, given
sufficiently large values of the constants.
A word on the constants of Lemma 9. Careful analysis of the proofs of [25, Thm. 2] and [41, Prop. 2]
reveals that c1 is exponential in ε and polynomial in the characteristics of the MC, while c2 is only polynomial
in the characteristics of the MC. More importantly, constant K0 is polynomial in the size of the MC and
polynomial in the largest weight W (exponential in its encoding). ⊓⊔
Analysis of the combined strategy. Our goal is to show that for any ε > 0, there exist two naturals K
and L such that λcmb1 proves the correctness of Theorem 2. First, we define L as a linear function of K. Note
that the main purpose of K is to create periods of type (a) long enough to have an expected mean-payoff
close to the optimal value achieved by λe1, i.e., ν
∗. The aim of L is for periods of type (b) to be long enough to
compensate the possible negative effect of periods of type (a) and thus ensure the worst-case requirement. As
stated before, L should not grow too quickly to preserve an overall mean-payoff which is mainly influenced
by periods of type (a) (hence close to the optimal expectation ν∗).
Definition 4. Given a natural constant K ∈ N, we define L =
⌊
K ·W + |S| ·W + |S| · µ∗
µ∗
⌋
+ 1.
Remark 7. Obviously, L needs to be proportional to K to preserve the worst-case requirement as the amount
to compensate is bounded by K ·W . Consequently, we can observe the need for the bookkeeping of Sum in
strategy λcmb1 in contrast to a non-dynamic alternation scheme between periods of type (a) and (b). Indeed,
in a strategy following the latter scheme, the long-term expectation would be close to K·ν
∗+L·µ∗
K+L . As L is not
constant but proportional to K, one can easily see that this expression does not tend to ν∗ when K tends
to infinity (which is required when ε tends to zero according to Lemma 9). Thus, strict alternation does not
suffice to satisfy the thresholds pair presented in Thm. 2.
Under the value of L given in Def. 4, Lemma 10 states that the worst-case requirement is satisfied. The
idea is to decompose any play into an infinite sequence of periods, each of them having a bounded length
and ensuring a strictly positive sum of weights, yielding an overall strictly positive mean-payoff of the play.
Lemma 10. For any K ∈ N, the combined strategy λcmb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 is such that for all λ2 ∈ Λ2, for all
pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λcmb1 , λ2), we have that MP(pi) > 0.
Proof. Let λ2 be an arbitrary strategy of P2 and pi any outcome in OutsG(sinit, λcmb1 , λ2). By definition of
λcmb1 , we decompose the play in a sequence of periods of type (a) and (b). That is, pi = ρ0ρ1ρ2 . . . where, for
all i ≥ 0, ρi is a finite sequence of states that is either of length K if ρi is of type (a) or of length L if ρi is of
type (b). Moreover, ρ0 is of type (a) and for all i ≥ 1, ρi is of type (b) if and only if ρi−1 is of type (a) and
such that Sum(ρi−1) ≤ 0 (i.e., the sum of weights along the sequence is not strictly positive). We regroup
each sequence of type (b) with its predecessor of type (a) and obtain pi = ρ′0ρ
′
1ρ
′
2 . . . such that all sequences
are either of type (a) or of type (a)+ (b).
Consider any sequence ρ′i of type (a). Since it is not followed by a period of type (b), we know that
Sum(ρ′i) > 0. Now consider any sequence ρ
′
i of type (a)+ (b). At the end of the period of type (a), the sum is
bounded from below by −K ·W . During the period of type (b), an optimal memoryless worst-case strategy
λwc1 is followed and consequently, all formed cycles have a mean-payoff at least equal to µ
∗. Hence, the sum
of weights over the period of type (b) is at least (L − |S|) · µ∗ − |S| ·W . By Def. 4, this induces that the
overall sum over the sequence of type (a)+ (b) is Sum(ρ′i) > 0.
In both cases, we have that Sum(ρ′i) > 0. But since weights are integers, this implies a stronger inequality:
Sum(ρ′i) ≥ 1. We go back to the play seen as an infinite sequence of states pi = s0s1s2 . . . . Thanks to the
previous observations, we can now state that the total sum of weights up to any state st, t ≥ 0, is bounded
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by TP(pi(t)) ≥ −
[
t mod (K + L)
]
·W +
⌊
t
K+L
⌋
· 1 ≥ −(K + L) ·W + t
K+L − 1. Hence the mean-payoff of
the play pi is MP(pi) ≥ lim inft→∞
[
−(K+L)·W
t
+ 1
K+L −
1
t
]
= 1
K+L > 0, which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
It remains to show that for any ε > 0, there exists a valueK ∈ N such that the expected value requirement
(Eq. (2)) is also satisfied by λcmb1 . This is proved in Lemma 11. Again, decomposition of plays into periods
needs to be considered. Furthermore, the crux of the proof resides in the use of Lemma 9: it induces that when
the length of periods of type (a) grows linearly, the probability of periods of type (b) decreases exponentially.
Since the length of periods of type (b) only grows linearly in K, the overall impact of periods (b) in the
expectation tends to zero when K tends to infinity. Hence, the expectation of λcmb1 tends to the optimal
expectation ν∗ and classical convergence analysis provides the result.
Lemma 11. For any ε > 0, there exists K ∈ N such that E
G[λcmb1 ,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) > ν
∗ − ε.
Proof. For the proof, we assume that ε ≤ ν∗, otherwise the claim is obviously true for any K ∈ N since
the mean-payoff of any outcome consistent with λcmb1 is strictly positive by application of Lemma 10. Now,
for a given K ∈ N, consider the corresponding finite MC M(K) = G[λcmb1 , λ
stoch
2 ] where λ
cmb
1 is defined
with the parameter K (i.e., periods of type (a) are of length K). To obtain the claim, we prove that
E
M(K)
sinit (MP) −−−−→
K→∞
ν∗. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 10, any outcome of M(K) is an outcome consistent
with λcmb1 in G and thus can be decomposed in an infinite sequence of periods of types (a) and (a)+ (b).
To begin with, we will consider (i) the expectation over one period of type (a), and (ii) the expectation
over one period of type (a) + (b), as well as the respective probabilities of seeing such periods whenever a
new period begins. Note that the probability of a period being of type (a) or (a) + (b) does not depend on
whether the previous one was of type (a) or (a) + (b), by definition of λcmb1 . Hence, the probability that
some period has a specific type, and the expected value of that period, are not influenced by what happened
over previous periods. For the sake of simplicity, we omit that different periods do not necessarily start in
the same state, as the resulting impact on the expectation is negligible for sufficiently long periods.
(i) Let us first consider periods of type (a). By Def. 3, P1 follows the strategy λe1 during those periods.
Recall that E
G[λe1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = ν
∗. Let us denote by e(a) the expected mean-payoff over a period of type (a).
By Lemma 9, for any ε > 0, there exists K0 ∈ N such that for all K ≥ K0, this expected value is bounded
from below by e(a) ≥ (1−F(K, ε)) · (ν
∗− ε)+F(K, ε) ·x, with x a lower bound on any consistent outcome.
Since any period of type (a) is not followed by a period of type (b) (otherwise it would be considered as a
period of type (a)+ (b)), we know that the sum of weights along the K steps of the period is greater than
or equal to 1, and therefore we can take x ≥ 1/K (cf. proof of Lemma 10).
(ii) Now, consider periods of type (a)+(b). As shown in the proof of Lemma 10, we know that the expected
mean-payoff over such a period, denoted by e(a)+(b), is greater than or equal to 1/(K + L). Now consider
the probability p(a)+(b) that a period is of type (a)+ (b). By definition of strategy λ
cmb
1 , p(a)+(b) is equal to
the probability of having a total sum of weights less than or equal to 0 after K steps of playing according to
λe1. Since we assume that ε ≤ ν
∗ and since ν∗ ≥ µ∗ > 0, we can bound from above this probability by the
probability to have a mean-payoff less than ν∗ − ε over the K steps. Repeating the argument of point (i)
and applying Lemma 9, we deduce that p(a)+(b) ≤ F(K, ε) for all K ≥ K0.
We now have sufficient arguments to study the overall expected value over m periods and express it as
a weighted average between the two types of periods considered. Let p(a) denote the probability of periods
of type (a). Note that p(a) = 1− p(a)+(b). The expected number of periods of type (a) is m · p(a). Similarly,
m · p(a)+(b) is the expected number of periods of type (a) + (b). The expected sum of weights over the m
periods is thereforem ·p(a) ·e(a) ·K+m ·p(a)+(b) ·e(a)+(b) ·(K+L) since periods of type (a) have length K and
periods of type (a)+(b) lengthK+L. The expected length of them periods ism·p(a)·K+m·p(a)+(b) ·(K+L).
Finally, we have that
E
M(K)
sinit,m periods
(MP) =
m · p(a) · e(a) ·K +m · p(a)+(b) · e(a)+(b) · (K + L)
m · p(a) ·K +m · p(a)+(b) · (K + L)
. (3)
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Clearly, this expression does not depend on the number of periods m. This is consistent with our analysis
since we argued that periods of type (a) and (a) + (b) are statistically independent. Also, note that this
reasoning is only correct for complete periods. Nonetheless, any prefix pi(n), n ≥ 0, of the play is composed
of a sequence of complete periods followed by a suffix of length bounded by (K + L) and of total sum of
weights bounded by −(K + L) ·W and (K + L) ·W . Hence, we characterize the expected mean-payoff over
the n first steps of a play as
⌊n
l
⌋
· l · E
M(K)
sinit, 1 period
(MP)− (K + L) ·W
n
≤ E
M(K)
sinit, n steps(MP) ≤
⌊n
l
⌋
· l · E
M(K)
sinit, 1 period
(MP) + (K + L) ·W
n
,
with l = p(a) ·K+ p(a)+(b) · (K+L), the expected length of a period. Naturally, the finite suffix proves to be
negligible when n grows, hence E
M(K)
sinit (MP) = lim infn→∞
[
E
M(K)
sinit, n steps(MP)
]
= E
M(K)
sinit, 1 period
(MP). Observe
that this equation uses the equality between the expectation over the values of plays and the limit of the
expectation over values of prefixes. This equality is verified for the mean-payoff value function but does not
need to be true for arbitrary value functions.
Back to Eq. (3), with m = 1, we use e(a)+(b) ≥ 1/(K+L) > 0 and assume K > 0 to obtain the inequality
EM(K)sinit (MP) ≥
p(a) · e(a)
p(a) + p(a)+(b) ·
(
K+L
K
) .
Again, we assume K large enough to ensure p(a) > 0 (such a K exists by consequence of Lemma 9) and get
EM(K)sinit (MP) ≥
e(a)
1 +
(
p(a)+(b)
p(a)
)
·
(
K+L
K
) .
By (i) and (ii), we have p(a) ≥ 1−F(K, ε), p(a)+(b) ≤ F(K, ε), and e(a) ≥ (1−F(K, ε)) · (ν
∗− ε). We derive
that
EM(K)sinit (MP) ≥
(1−F(K, ε)) · (ν∗ − ε)
1 + F(K,ε)·(K+L)(1−F(K,ε))·K
. (4)
Recall that ultimately, we want to prove that E
M(K)
sinit (MP) −−−−→
K→∞
ν∗. Consider what happens when K →∞
in Eq. (4): notice that L is linear in K by Def. 4, hence L → ∞, and that F(K, ε) → 0 by Lemma 9. This
does not suffice to conclude on the possible convergence of the lower bound given in Eq. (4). The crux of the
argument is given by Lemma 9: F(K, ε) decreases exponentially for a linear increase in K. Thus, we have
that F(K, ε) · (K + L)→ 0. Therefore,
lim
K→∞

 (1−F(K, ε)) · (ν∗ − ε)
1 + F(K,ε)·(K+L)(1−F(K,ε))·K

 = ν∗ − ε. (5)
Notice two facts. First, for any K ∈ N, we have that E
M(K)
sinit (MP) ≤ E
G[λe1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = ν
∗ by the optimality
of λe1. Second, Eq. (5) is valid for any ε such that ν
∗ ≥ ε > 0. Hence we observe that the sequence of expected
values (E
M(K)
sinit (MP))K≥0 is bounded from above and from below by two sequences converging to ν
∗. Ergo
E
M(K)
sinit (MP) −−−−→
K→∞
ν∗. By definition of convergence, for any ε such that ν∗ ≥ ε > 0, there exists K ∈ N
such that E
M(K)
sinit (MP) > ν
∗ − ε, which concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
Based on Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, Theorem 2 follows and concludes our analysis of winning ECs with
no edges of probability zero. We extend these results to arbitrary winning ECs in the next section.
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4.7 Starting in a winning end-component: witness-and-secure strategy
We now turn to winning ECs with potentially edges of probability zero, i.e., E∆ ⊆ E. We present in this
section how to construct a finite-memory strategy that can benefit ε-closely from the maximal expectation
achievable in such winning ECs when facing the stochastic model λstoch2 , while guaranteeing satisfaction of
the worst-case requirement even against arbitrary strategies of P2 (i.e., strategies that may use edges in
E \ E∆). It is crucial to notice that we now consider a complete game, i.e., not necessarily reduced to a
single winning EC as in Sect. 4.6. Still, we assume that the play starts in a winning EC: consistent outcomes
will stay in it when P2 follows λstoch2 (because P1 will have no interest to leave), but may exit the EC if P2
takes edges of probability zero, either by the action of P2 (recall there may exist edges that leave the EC in
E \E∆) or the action of P1 (which may need to leave to guarantee a strictly positive mean-payoff).
Theorem 3. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be a two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 a
memoryless stochastic model of P2, P = G[λ
stoch
2 ] = (G, S1, S∆ = S2, ∆ = λ
stoch
2 ) the resulting MDP, U ∈ W
a winning EC, sinit ∈ U an initial state inside the EC, and ν∗ ∈ Q the maximal expected value achievable by
P1 in P ⇂ U . Then, for all ε > 0, there exists a finite-memory strategy of P1 that satisfies the BWC problem
for the thresholds pair (0, ν∗ − ε).
We prove this theorem in the following. Let us first give some key intuition. With respect to the expected
value requirement of Eq. (2), the hypothesis is that P2 will follow its stochastic model λstoch2 . Hence, he
will only play edges in E∆ and the combined strategy proposed in Sect. 4.6 suffices to achieve the claimed
expectation and guarantee the worst-case threshold against λstoch2 (basically, we can apply Thm. 2 on G∆).
Now, we still have to account for arbitrary strategies of P2 to satisfy the worst-case requirement of Eq. (1).
Notice that the combined strategy suffices to ensure it against all strategies playing exclusively in E∆. So,
it only remains to deal with strategies that choose some edges in E \ E∆. It is easy for P1 to witness if P2
chooses an edge outside E∆ (as the stochastic model is assumed known by P1). If this happens, P1 can secure
its mean-payoff value by switching from the combined strategy to a worst-case winning strategy, which exists
in all states due to the preprocessing of the game (Sect. 4.3).
Basis strategies.We denote by λsec1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 (G) a pure memoryless worst-case winning strategy on G. This
strategy exists in all states of the game due to the preprocessing, including states of the EC U ∈ W . Still, it
may require leaving the EC to ensure a strictly positive mean-payoff (because the definition of winning ECs
only consider edges in E∆). When using λ
stoch
2 , P2 cannot force leaving the winning EC U ∈ W . By Thm. 2,
P1 has a finite-memory strategy on G∆ ⇂ U , denoted λ
cmb
1 , that ensures Eq. (2), and verifies Eq. (1), if we
restrict P2 to strategies in Λ2(G∆).
Defining a witness-and-secure strategy. In order to prove Thm. 3, we define a pure finite-memory
witness-and-secure strategy as follows.
Definition 5. In a game G such that P = G[λstoch2 ], U ∈ W is a winning EC and sinit ∈ U is the initial
state, we define the witness-and-secure strategy λwns1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G) as follows.
(i) Play the combined strategy λcmb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G∆ ⇂ U) as long as P2 picks edges in E∆.
(ii) As soon as P2 takes an edge in E \ E∆,7 play the worst-case winning strategy λsec1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 (G) forever.
This strategy makes use of the combined strategy λcmb1 presented in Def. 3. Hence it is similarly parameterized
by two naturals K and L that respectively define the lengths of periods of type (a) and of type (b) in Def. 3.
Again, we will show that for any ε > 0, we can find values for K and L such that Thm. 3 is verified. Notice
that λwns1 is finite-memory since λ
cmb
1 and λ
sec
1 are too and watching for the appearance of an edge belonging
to E \ E∆ in the actions of the adversary only requires a finite amount of memory.
Intuitively, the witness-and-secure strategy acts as follows. As long as P2 conforms to E∆, playing in G
is essentially the same as playing in G∆. Hence λ
wns
1 prescribes acting like λ
cmb
1 , which induces satisfaction
7 More complex switching schemes could be used, such as only switching if the edge taken is really dangerous (i.e.,
part of a non strictly positive cycle), switching after a bounded number of deviations from the support, etc. But
this simple scheme proves to be sufficient to realize Thm. 3 and is easier to analyze.
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of the BWC problem in G∆ ⇂ U by Thm. 2. Two requirements must be satisfied by λ
wns
1 : (a) the worst-case
and (b) the expected value. First consider (a). Two situations may occur. Either the outcome is such that
λwns1 always stays in phase (i) and strategy λ
cmb
1 is used forever in G∆ ⇂ U , in which case direct application of
Thm. 2 suffices to prove that Eq. (1) is satisfied. Or, the outcome is such that λwns1 switches to phase (ii), in
which case satisfaction of the worst-case requirement follows by definition of λsec1 . Now consider (b). Notice
that the only consistent outcomes always stay in phase (i), by definition of the set OutsG(sinit, λ
wns
1 , λ
stoch
2 )
which does not allow for choices outside of E∆. Hence the overall expectation is equal to the one over
outcomes staying in phase (i). By Def. 5, the latter is exactly the expectation of λcmb1 , which satisfies the
threshold by Thm. 2. Thus, the existence of fitting values of K and L for Thm. 3 is guaranteed.
Illustration. Consider the winning EC U2 in the game of Fig. 2 and the initial state s6 ∈ U2. Notice that
P1 can ensure a strictly positive mean-payoff in the subgame G∆ ⇂ U2, but not in G ⇂ U2. Indeed, by
always choosing the −1 edges (which requires edge (s7, s6) ∈ E∆ \E), P2 can ensure a negative mean-payoff
whatever the strategy of P1. However, there exists a strategy that ensures Eq. (1), i.e., yields a strictly
positive mean-payoff against any strategy in Λ2(G), by leaving the EC. Let λ
sec
1 be the memoryless strategy
that takes the edge (s6, s9) and then cycle on (s10s9)
ω forever: it guarantees a mean-payoff of 1 > 0.
For a moment, consider the EC U2 in G∆. Graphically, it means that the −1 edge from s7 to s6 disappears.
In the subgame G∆ ⇂ U2, there are two particular memoryless strategies. The optimal worst-case strategy
λwc1 guarantees a mean-payoff of 1/2 > 0 by choosing to go to s7. The optimal expectation strategy λ
e
1 yields
an expected mean-payoff of 3 by choosing to go to s8 (notice this strategy yields the same expectation in
P∆ ⇂ U2 and P ⇂ U2). Based on them, we build the combined strategy λ
cmb
1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G∆ ⇂ U2) as defined
in Def. 3 and by Thm. 2, for any ε > 0, there are values of K and L such that it satisfies the BWC
problem for thresholds (0, 3 − ε) in G∆ ⇂ U2. For example, for parameters K = L = 2, we have that
E
(P∆⇂U2)[λ
cmb
1 ]
s6 (MP) = E
(P ⇂U2)[λ
cmb
1 ]
s6 (MP) = 13/6.
We construct the witness-and-secure strategy λwns1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G) based on λ
cmb
1 and λ
sec
1 as described by
Def. 5. In this case, that means playing as λcmb1 until the −1 edge from s7 to s6 is taken by P2. As previously
sketched, such a strategy ensures a worst-case mean-payoff equal to 1 > 0 thanks to λsec1 and yields an
expectation E
P [λwns1 ]
s6 (MP) = 13/6 for K = L = 2.
Finally, notice that securing the mean-payoff by switching to phase (ii) of λwns1 is needed to satisfy the
worst-case requirement if P2 plays in E \ E∆. Also, observe that it is still necessary to alternate according
to λcmb1 in G∆ ⇂ U2 and that playing λ
e
1 is not sufficient to ensure the worst-case (because P1 has to deal
with the −1 edge from s8 to s6 that remains in E∆).
Analysis of the witness-and-secure strategy. We close our discussion of winning ECs with the formal
proof of Thm. 3 through the use of the witness-and-secure strategy λwns1 (Def. 5).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Assume an arbitrary ε > 0. Let K,L ∈ N be such that the combined strategy
λcmb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G∆ ⇂ U), as defined in Def. 3, satisfies the BWC problem for thresholds (0, ν
∗ − ε) in G∆ ⇂ U .
The existence of such values is guaranteed by Thm. 2. We build the finite-memory strategy λwns1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G)
according to Def. 5 and claim it satisfies the BWC problem for thresholds (0, ν∗ − ε) in G.
First, consider the worst-case. Let λ2 ∈ Λ2(G) be any strategy of P2 and pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
wns
1 , λ2) be any
outcome consistent with λwns1 . Two cases are possible. One, P2 keeps choosing edges in E∆ forever. That
is, for pi = s0s1s2 . . . , for all i ≥ 0 such that si ∈ S∆ = S2, we have that (si, si+1) ∈ E∆. Then, the play
is constrained to G∆ ⇂ U and consistent with λ
cmb
1 . Hence, it follows from Thm. 2 (and Lemma 10) that
MP(pi) > 0. Two, P2 chooses some edges in E \ E∆. That is, for pi = s0s1s2 . . . , there exists i ≥ 0 such
that (si, si+1) 6∈ E∆. Let i0 be the smallest index where it happens. By definition of λwns1 , we know that
P2 switches to λsec1 at step i0. Hence the suffix pi
′ = si0si0+1si0+2 . . . is consistent with λ
sec
1 . Consequently,
MP(pi′) > 0. By prefix-independence of the mean-payoff value function, we conclude that MP(pi) > 0, which
closes the case of the worst-case requirement.
Second, consider the expected value requirement. We claim that E
G[λwns1 ,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) > ν
∗−ε. By definition,
OutsG(sinit, λ
wns
1 , λ
stoch
2 ) = OutsP (sinit, λ
wns
1 ) only contains plays where P2 conforms to E∆ at all times. Such
plays never exit the EC and by Def. 5, we have that OutsG(sinit, λ
wns
1 , λ
stoch
2 ) = OutsG∆(sinit, λ
cmb
1 , λ
stoch
2 ). Also
note that the probability measure of plays of those two sets is identical. Hence, by Thm. 2 (and Lemma 11),
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we obtain that E
G[λwns1 ,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = E
G∆[λ
cmb
1 ,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) > ν
∗ − ε. This sets the case for the expectation and
concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
4.8 Global strategy: favor reaching the highest valued winning end-components
We now have all the elements needed to describe the final steps of algorithm BWC MP (lines 12-17) and
prove its correctness. In this section, we first describe (Def. 6) how to modify the weights of the MDP
P = G[λstoch2 ] such that a classical optimal expectation strategy in the modified MDP P
′ will naturally try
to reach winning ECs with the highest combined expectation. This step is a cornerstone of the global strategy
λglb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G) that we define next (Def. 7). This strategy is a by-product of algorithm BWC MP.
We study the adequacy of algorithm BWC MP through two lemmas. In Lemma 12, we prove its cor-
rectness, i.e., that if it returns Yes, then the global strategy λglb1 satisfies the BWC problem for the given
thresholds. In Lemma 13, we show its completeness, i.e., that if it returns No, then there exists no finite-
memory strategy that satisfies the BWC problem. Combining those two lemmas and the analysis of the
preprocessing conducted in Sect. 4.3, we conclude that algorithm BWC MP is a valid algorithm to solve
the BWC problem on any two-player game with the mean-payoff value function.
Modifying the MDP to naturally reach winning ECs. Our motivation is the creation of an MDP P ′
such that an optimal strategy in P ′ maximizes the expectation without using negligible states (as defined
in Sect. 4.4, that is, with regard to G and P ). Indeed, we know by Lemma 8 that winning ECs should
be almost-surely eventually used in order to satisfy the worst-case requirement of the BWC problem. In
particular, states in losing ECs and not in any winning sub-EC should be avoided in the long-run.
Definition 6. Given G = (G, S1, S2), G = (S,E,w) and P = G[λstoch2 ], we define G
′ = (G′, S1, S2), G′ =
(S,E,w′) and P ′ = G′[λstoch2 ] by modifying the weight function as follows:
∀ e = (s1, s2) ∈ E, w
′(e) :=
{
w(e) if ∃ U ∈ Uw s.t. {s1, s2} ⊆ U,
0 otherwise.
Let λe1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 (P
′) be a pure memoryless strategy of P1 that maximizes the expected mean-payoff in P ′.
Such a strategy always exists [20]. Note that following λe1 does not suffice to satisfy the BWC problem in
general (Rem. 6). This strategy will be part of the global strategy λglb1 (Def. 7): its role is to maximize the
combined expectation of reachable winning ECs, while avoiding using negligible states, in particular states
that only belong to losing ECs. The strategy to adopt inside winning ECs will be prescribed by another part
of the global strategy, based on what we have established in Sect. 4.7. Observe that it suffices to consider
the maximal winning ECs in order to maximize the expectation, as proved by Lemma 6.
Remark 8. Notice that λe1 is also well-defined in P and G thanks to the shared underlying graph. Also, recall
that all states of G are worst-case winning due to the preprocessing. Let λwc1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 (G) be an optimal
worst-case winning strategy. We observe that all states remain worst-case winning in G′ for the reason that
an optimal worst-case strategy only needs to visit edges involving negligible states finitely often. Indeed,
either these negligible states do not belong to any EC, in which case P1 cannot rely on them to satisfy the
worst-case requirement (as he cannot ensure that he will be able to see them infinitely often), or they belong
to losing ECs and no winning sub-EC, in which case P1 only needs to visit them a finite number of times
(basically to get out of the set (
⋃
U∈E U) \ (
⋃
U∈W U) if the play starts in it and reach the set
⋃
U∈W U).
Hence, the guaranteed mean-payoff is not impacted by the changes described in Def. 6: it remains strictly
positive in all states. By virtue of this, we deduce that ∀ s ∈ S, E
P ′[λe1]
s (MP) ≥ E
P ′[λwc1 ]
s (MP) > 0, and as
such, that strategy λe1 will not prescribe staying in the set (
⋃
U∈E U)\ (
⋃
U∈W U) forever. Indeed, it is always
beneficial to exit it and obtain a strictly positive expectation instead of an expectation equal to zero (recall
all edges involving negligible states are mapped to weight zero by Def. 6).
Defining a global strategy. Based on the memoryless strategies λe1 and λ
wc
1 in G (as defined above), and
the pure finite-memory witness-and-secure strategy λwns1 in winning ECs (as presented in Def. 5 - parameters
28
K and L may vary depending on the actual corresponding EC), we build a global strategy λglb1 in G as follows.
This strategy is parameterized by a natural constant N ∈ N.
Definition 7. In a game G, we define the global strategy λglb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G) as follows.
(a) Play λe1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 (G) for N steps.
(b) Let s ∈ S be the reached state.
(b.1) If s ∈ U ∈ Uw, play the corresponding strategy λwns1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 (G) forever.
(b.2) Else play λwc1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 (G) forever.
Let us sketch this strategy. In phase (a), the optimal expectation strategy in P ′ is followed. It will drive the
outcomes towards the ECs with the highest expected values. By taking N large enough, we can ensure that
the probability of being in an EC will be arbitrarily close to one (by Lemma 5). As a result of the weights
modification described in Def. 6, we can further ensure that the probability of being inside a winning EC will
be arbitrarily close to one. Note that in phase (b.1), the witness-and-secure strategy guarantees satisfaction
of the worst-case requirement while yielding an expectation arbitrarily close to the optimal expectation of
the EC (as proved in Sect. 4.7). Also, in phase (b.2), the mean-payoff of outcomes is strictly positive, and the
probability of being in (b.2) can be arbitrarily close to zero for large enough values of N . Overall, we obtain
that λglb1 satisfies the worst-case requirement because the strategies played in the two terminal phases, (b.1)
and (b.2), all guarantee its satisfaction and the mean-payoff is prefix-independent (hence it is not impacted
by phase (a)). Furthermore, the expectation of λglb1 can be arbitrarily close to the maximal expectation ν
∗
achievable in P ′ (i.e., the one achieved by λe1) by taking sufficiently large values for the constants K, L
and N . Hence, if ν∗ > ν, λglb1 is a proper BWC satisfying strategy for P1.
Finally, ν∗ constitutes an upper bound to the expectation of any strategy of P1 in P
′. By Lemma 8, it
is also an upper bound on the expectation of any strategy that satisfies the worst-case requirement in the
original game and MDP. It follows that if ν∗ ≤ ν, then there exists no finite-memory strategy that satisfies
the BWC problem. As the validity of the preprocessing was shown in Sect. 4.3, this let us conclude that
algorithm BWC MP is both correct and complete.
Illustration. Consider the game G depicted in Fig. 2 and the associated MDP P = G[λstoch2 ]. Following
Lemma 5, analysis of the maximal ECs U1, U2 and U3 reveals that the maximal expected mean-payoff
achievable in P is 4. It is for example obtained by the memoryless strategy that chooses to go to s2 from s1
and to s4 from s3. Observe that playing in U1 forever is needed to achieve this expectation. By Lemma 8,
this should not be allowed as the worst-case cannot be ensured if it is. Indeed, P2 can produce worst-case
losing outcomes by playing the −1 edge. Clearly, the maximal expected value that P1 can ensure while
guaranteeing the worst-case requirement is thus bounded by the maximal expectation in P ′, i.e., by 3. Let
λe1 denote an optimal memoryless expectation strategy in P
′ that tries to enter U2 by playing (s1, s2) and
(s3, s5), and then plays edge (s6, s8) forever.
Observe that algorithm BWC MP answers Yes for any thresholds pair (0, ν) such that ν < 3. For the
sake of illustration, we construct the global strategy λglb1 as presented in Def. 7 with N = 6 and K = L = 2.
For the first six steps, it behaves exactly as λe1. Note that after the six steps, the probability of being in U2
is 1/4 + 1/8 = 3/8. Then, λglb1 switches to another strategy depending on the current state (λ
wns
1 or λ
wc
1 )
and sticks to this strategy forever. Particularly, if the current state belongs to U2, it switches to λ
wns
1 as
described in Def. 5 for K = L = 2, which guarantees the worst-case threshold and induces an expectation
of 13/6 (Sect. 4.7). By definition of λglb1 on the sample game G, if the current state after six steps is not
in U2, then λ
glb
1 switches to λ
wc
1 which guarantees a mean-payoff of 1 by reaching state s9 and then playing
(s9s10)
ω. Overall, the expected mean-payoff of λglb1 against λ
stoch
2 is E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
s1 (MP) ≥
3
8 ·
13
6 +
5
8 · 1 =
23
16 .
Notice that by taking N , K and L large enough, it is possible to satisfy the BWC problem for any ν < 3 with
the strategy λglb1 . Also, observe that the winning EC U2 is crucial to achieve expectations strictly greater
than 2, which is the upper bound when limited to EC U3. For example, N = 25 and K = L = 2 implies an
expectation strictly greater than 2 for the global strategy.
Lastly, note that in general, the maximal expectation achievable in P ′ (and thus in P when limited to
strategies that respect the worst-case requirement) may depend on a combination of ECs instead of a unique
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one. This is transparent through the solving of the expected value problem in the MDP P ′. Hence, the
approach followed by our algorithm is a way of solving a complex problem by breaking it into smaller pieces.
Correctness and completeness.We start by proving the correctness of the algorithmBWC MP described
in Alg. 1 and the soundness of the global strategy presented in Def. 7 to satisfy the BWC problem.
Lemma 12 (correctness). If algorithm BWC MP answers Yes, then there exist values of the parame-
ters N and K such that the global strategy λglb1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 satisfies the BWC mean-payoff problem.
Proof. We assume the answer returned by BWC MP is Yes and we prove the claim.
First, consider the worst-case requirement (Eq. (1)). Let λ2 ∈ Λ2 be an arbitrary strategy of P2. Let N
take an arbitrary value in N, and for any winning EC U ∈ Uw, let KU take an arbitrary value in N and
LU be defined according to Def. 4 with regard to KU . Consider the outcomes consistent with λ
glb
1 and λ2.
Our goal is to prove that for all outcomes pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
glb
1 , λ2), we have that MP(pi) > 0. Let pi be an
arbitrary outcome in this set, s = Last(pi(N)) be the state reached after phase (a) of the global strategy,
and pi′ be the suffix play such that pi = pi(N) · pi′. Two cases are possible. First, assume s ∈ U for some
maximal winning EC U ∈ Uw. Then, pi′ is consistent with the witness-and-secure strategy λwns1 (as presented
in Sect. 4.7 for initial states in U). By Thm. 3, MP(pi′) > 0. Second, assume s 6∈
⋃
U∈Uw
U , i.e., s ∈ Sneg.
Then, pi′ is consistent with the worst-case winning strategy λwc1 provided by the preprocessing, and we have
that MP(pi′) > 0. By prefix-independence of the mean-payoff value function, we conclude that in both cases,
MP(pi) = MP(pi′) > 0, proving that strategy λglb1 ensures the worst-case requirement.
Second, consider the expected value requirement (Eq. (2)). We need to prove that E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) > ν
for some well-chosen values of N and K ∈ N. Formally, the value KU may be different in each winning EC
U ∈ Uw, so we will take a uniform value K sufficiently large to ensure that it works for all ECs. Values LU (K)
are defined according to Def. 4. Again noting that the weights encountered during phase (a) of strategy λglb1
have no impact on the mean-payoff of plays (because phase (a) is of finite duration and all weights are also
finite), we formulate the expectation as
E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) =
∑
U∈Uw
[
pN(U) · eK(U)
]
+
∑
s∈Sneg
[
pN (s) · ewc(s)
]
, (6)
where pN(U) denotes the probability to be in a state belonging to the maximal winning EC U ∈ Uw after N
steps of following strategy λe1 (i.e., phase (a)); eK(U) denotes the expectation of plays starting in U and
consistent with λwns1 for values K and LU (K) of the parameters (this expectation is identical for all initial
states in the EC); pN (s) denotes the probability to be in a given negligible state s ∈ Sneg (i.e., outside of
winning ECs) after phase (a); and ewc(s) denotes the expectation over plays that start in such a state s and
are consistent with the worst-case strategy λwc1 . Observe that
∑
s∈Sneg
pN (s) = 1−
∑
U∈Uw
pN (U).
Similarly, we write the expectation of the optimal expectation strategy λe1 in P
′ as E
G′[λe1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) =∑
U∈Uw
[
p(U) · e(U)
]
, where p(U) and e(U) denote the probability and the expectation of maximal winning
ECs when strategy λe1 is followed forever. Note that this equation depends uniquely on winning ECs by
consequence of Rem. 8, and specifically maximal winning ECs by further application of Lemma 6. In addition,
observe that E
G′[λe1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = E
G[λe1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) = ν
∗, as the weight modification (Def. 6) does not alter
winning ECs.
We claim that E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) tends to ν
∗ when N and K tend to infinity. We study the terms of
Eq. (6). Note that ewc takes a bounded value (in ]0, W ] by definition of λ
wc
1 ). By application of the analysis
developed in Lemma 11 and Theorem 3, we have that ∀U ∈ Uw, eK(U) −−−−→
K→∞
e(U). Furthermore, by
definition of λe1 we have that ∀U ∈ Uw, pN (U) −−−−→
N→∞
p(U), and by definition of the modified weight
function (Def. 6) and Rem. 8, that
∑
U∈Uw
pN (U) −−−−→
N→∞
∑
U∈Uw
p(U) = 1. Summing up, we obtain as
needed that E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) −−−−−−→
N,K→∞
ν∗.
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By convergence, for all ε > 0, there exist N,K ∈ N such that E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) ≥ ν
∗ − ε. Since al-
gorithm BWC MP answered Yes, we have that ν∗ > ν. Hence, there exist values N,K ∈ N such that
E
G[λglb
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) > ν. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
In order to prove that the algorithm solves the BWC problem (Def. 1) for the mean-payoff value function,
we still need to establish its completeness: if the global strategy does not suffice to satisfy some thresholds
pair, then no finite-memory strategy can do it.
Lemma 13 (completeness). If algorithm BWC MP answers No, then there exists no finite-memory
strategy of P1 that satisfies the BWC mean-payoff problem.
Proof. By contradiction, assume there exists λf1 ∈ Λ
F
1 that satisfies the BWC problem for thresholds (0, ν).
We claim that algorithm BWC MP answers Yes. First, notice that the algorithm cannot answer No at
line 5 since λf1 satisfies the worst-case requirement from the initial state sinit. Hence it remains to prove
that ν∗, as computed by the algorithm, is such that ν∗ > ν. If it is the case, the algorithm will answer Yes,
which proves our claim.
By hypothesis, strategy λf1 induces an expectation E
G[λf
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) > ν. By Lemma 8, we have that
E
G[λf
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) = E
G′[λf
1
,λstoch2 ]
sinit (MP) = E
P ′[λf
1
]
sinit (MP), with G
′ the game obtained by the transformation defined
in Def. 6. Moreover, by definition of the optimal expectation, we have that for all λ1 ∈ Λ1, ν∗ ≥ E
P ′[λ1]
sinit (MP).
In particular, this inequality is verified for strategy λf1 . Hence, we obtain that ν
∗ ≥ E
P ′[λf
1
]
sinit (MP) > ν.
Consequently, the answer of the algorithm is Yes and the lemma is proved. ⊓⊔
In summary, correctness and completeness of algorithm BWC MP as stated in Thm. 1 follows from the
combination of Lemma 12, Lemma 13 and the validity of the preprocessing, as presented in Sect. 4.3. The
complexity of the algorithm is discussed in the next section (Lemma 14), as well as matching lower bounds
for the BWC problem (Lemma 15).
4.9 Complexity: algorithm and lower bound
In this section, we prove that the BWC problem is in NP ∩ coNP (Lemma 14), as algorithm BWC MP is
polynomial in the complexity of the worst-case threshold problem, which also belongs to NP∩ coNP [45,31].
Whether the latter is in P or not is a long-standing open problem [6,10]. In Lemma 15, we establish that it
reduces in polynomial time to the BWC problem. Given the outstanding nature of the worst-case threshold
problem membership to P, algorithm BWC MP can thus be considered optimal. Furthermore, we observe
that if the worst-case threshold problem were proved to be solvable in deterministic polynomial time, then
algorithm BWC MP would also take polynomial time (Rem. 9).
The size of the input for algorithm BWC MP depends polynomially on (i) the number of states of the
input game |Si|, (ii) the number of edges of the input game |Ei|, (iii) the number of bits of the encoding of
weights V i = log2W
i, (iv) the size of the memory of the Moore machine |Mem|, (v) the size of the supports
and the length of the encoding of probabilities for the next-action function αn, and (vi) the encoding of the
thresholds µ, ν ∈ Q.
Lemma 14. Algorithm BWC MP requires polynomial time plus a polynomially-many calls to an NP∩coNP
oracle solving the worst-case threshold problem. Hence the beyond worst-case problem for the mean-payoff is
in NP ∩ coNP.
Proof. To prove NP ∩ coNP-membership, we review each step of the algorithm sequentially. Lines 1-2 and
lines 4-10 are at most polynomial in the input. Line 3 consists in solving the worst-case threshold problem
on the input game Gi: this can be done by calling an NP∩ coNP oracle [45,31]. Overall, the preprocessing is
in NP ∩ coNP and produces a game G such that |G| ≤ |Gi| · |M(λi2)|, using the natural definitions of those
sizes as polynomial functions of the values described in points (i) to (vi).
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For the main algorithm, the complexities are as follows. Line 11 is the call to sub-algorithmMWEC(P∆),
which has been proved to only make a polynomial number of calls to an NP∩coNP oracle in Lemma 7. Note
that the size of P = G[λstoch2 ] is polynomial in the input. The weights modification (line 12) requires linear
time (polynomial in the input game) as do lines 14-17. Finally, computing the maximal expected value on
P ′ (line 13) is polynomial in |P ′| via linear programming [20], hence polynomial in the input size.
In conclusion, the algorithm executes a polynomial number of operations, and each of them belongs to P
or is a call to an NP∩ coNP oracle. Therefore, the BWC problem for the mean-payoff belongs to PNP∩coNP.
By [4], we know that PNP∩coNP = NP ∩ coNP, which proves the claim. ⊓⊔
Remark 9. Assume an algorithm Ptime wc is established to solve the worst-case threshold problem in
deterministic polynomial time. Then, the complexities of algorithm BWC MP and sub-algorithm MWEC
boil down to a polynomial number of polynomial time operations and external calls, and it follows that the
BWC mean-payoff problem is in P .
Reduction of the worst-case threshold problem to the BWC one seems natural by Eq. (1). Still, we need
to pay attention to the strict inequality in the BWC problem definition: we use the existence of memoryless
winning strategies for the worst-case problem and careful analysis of the domain of the mean-payoff values
of outcomes to prove that it is not restrictive. The expected value part of the BWC problem can be defined
arbitrarily under certain conditions. Our complexity results are summed up in Thm. 1.
Lemma 15. The worst-case threshold problem on mean-payoff games reduces in polynomial time to the
BWC mean-payoff problem.
Proof. Given a game G = (G, S1, S2), its underlying graph G = (S,E,w), an initial state sinit ∈ S, and the
worst-case threshold µ = 0 (without loss of generality), the worst-case threshold problem asks if the following
proposition is true:
∃λ1 ∈ Λ1, ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), MP(pi) ≥ 0. (7)
By the results of [33,19], it is equivalent to restrict both players to pure memoryless strategies:
∃λpm1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 , ∀λ
pm
2 ∈ Λ
PM
2 , ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
pm
1 , λ
pm
2 ), MP(pi) ≥ 0. (8)
It is well-known that in this context, MP(pi) ≥ 0 ⇔ MP(pi) > − 1|S| . Indeed, consider the following
argument. First, the mean-payoff of any outcome pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
pm
1 , λ
pm
2 ) can be trivially bounded by
−W ≤ MP(pi) ≤ W , with W the largest absolute value of any weight assigned by w to edges of G. Second,
consider the decomposition of pi into simple cycles (i.e., cycles with no repeated state except for the starting
and ending state). Since weights are integers, any simple cycle has an associated mean-payoff belonging to
{−W, . . . ,− 1|S| , 0,
1
|S| , . . . ,W}. As both strategies are memoryless, any outcome pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
pm
1 , λ
pm
2 )
will ultimately consist in a repeated simple cycle. Hence we have that MP(pi) ∈ {−W, . . . ,− 1|S| , 0,
1
|S| , . . . ,W}
and we observe that no value can be taken between − 1|S| and 0.
Consequently, Eq. (8) is equivalent to
∃λpm1 ∈ Λ
PM
1 , ∀λ
pm
2 ∈ Λ
PM
2 , ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ
pm
1 , λ
pm
2 ), MP(pi) > −
1
|S|
. (9)
To formulate Eq. (9) in terms of a BWC problem, we have to define an expected value threshold ν ∈ Q
and a stochastic model λstoch2 ∈ Λ
F
2 . Since all plays pi ∈ Plays(G) satisfy MP(pi) ≥ −W by definition of the
weight function, we trivially have that ∀λ1 ∈ Λ1, ∀λstoch2 ∈ Λ
F
2 , E
G[λ1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (MP) ≥ −W . Hence, it suffices
to fix an arbitrary stochastic model λstoch2 ∈ Λ
F
2 and an arbitrary expectation threshold ν < −W to obtain
that Eq. (7) is satisfied if and only if P1 has a strategy to satisfy the BWC problem for thresholds (−
1
|S| , ν)
against the stochastic model λstoch2 . Notice this reduction is polynomial because we can choose a simple
stochastic model (e.g., a memoryless strategy requires a Moore machine of size linear in the size of the game)
and a value of ν that will not require a super-polynomial growth of the encodings (e.g., ν = −W − 1). ⊓⊔
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4.10 Memory requirements
s2s1s3
1
2
1
2
1
1
0
−X
X + 5
Fig. 5: Family of games (G(X))X∈N0 requiring
polynomial memory in W = X + 5 to satisfy the
BWC problem for thresholds (0, ν ∈ ]1, 5/4[).
Across the previous sections, we have studied the com-
plexity of deciding the BWC problem, i.e., deciding the
existence of a finite-memory strategy of P1 satisfying
Def. 1 for the mean-payoff value function. Now, we fo-
cus on the size of the memory used by such a strategy.
In Thm. 4, we give an upper bound for the memory of
the global strategy described in Def. 7 (which has been
shown to suffice if satisfaction of the BWC problem is
possible). This is obtained through careful analysis of
the structure of involved strategies (global, witness-and-
secure, combined). All of them are based on alternation
between well-chosen pure memoryless strategies, based
on parameters N , K and L ∈ N. We prove that these values only need to be polynomial in the size of the
game and the stochastic model, and in the values of weights and thresholds.
Furthermore, we prove this upper bound to be tight in the sense that polynomial memory in the values
of weights is needed in general. To establish this result, we exhibit a family of games (G(X))X∈N0 , presented
in Fig. 5, which requires polynomial memory in the largest absolute weight.
Theorem 4. Memory of pseudo-polynomial size may be necessary and is always sufficient to satisfy the
BWC problem for the mean-payoff: polynomial in the size of the game and the stochastic model, and polyno-
mial in the weight and threshold values.
Proof. We first consider the upper bound on memory, derived by analysis of the global strategy λglb1 (Def. 7).
Observe that it follows the memoryless strategy λe1 for N steps before switching to phase (b). The correctness
of the strategy (Lemma 12) relies on the existence of a value N such that the probability of being in an EC
after N steps is high enough. We argue that N does not need to be exponentially large.
Consider the probability to be outside of winning ECs after N steps. By classical results on MCs, this
probability decreases exponentially fast when N grows. Indeed, to prove it, it suffices to consider the chain
G[λe1, λ
stoch
2 ], replace BSCCs by absorbing states and observe that the probability of absorption tends towards
one exponentially fast [26]. Now, consider the expectation of the global strategy for given constants N andK,
as given in Eq. (6). Let ν < ν∗ − ε be the expected value threshold considered in the BWC problem (as
before, we assume µ < ν < ν∗ otherwise the problem is trivial). Assume that K is sufficiently large to have∑
U∈Uw
p(U)·eK(U) > ν
∗−ε′, with ε′ < ε. We want to establish how large N needs to be to ensure an overall
expectation strictly greater than ν. Since ewc(s) can be trivially lower bounded by zero for all s ∈ Sneg, it is
clear that to obtain the needed property, we need to have values pN (U) growing polynomially with ε and ν
∗.
As the growth of pN (U) is exponential in the growth of the value N , we obtain that a logarithmic value
of N , hence polynomial in the encoding, suffices to achieve the desired expected value.
Similarly, we study the strategies followed in phase (b) of the global strategy (Def. 7). The case (b.2) is
the easiest: the worst-case strategy λwc1 is memoryless. In case (b.1), the witness-and-secure strategy λ
wns
1
is used. By Def. 5, this strategy needs polynomial memory to witness the use of edges in E \ E∆ and to
implement the memoryless secure strategy λsec1 . It also needs to implement the combined strategy λ
cmb
1 ,
based on alternation between memoryless strategies. The size of the memory of λcmb1 is polynomial in K, L
and the largest absolute value taken by Sum, as well as in the size of the game. The proof of Lemma 9
guarantees that for constant K, a value polynomial in the size of the input game and the stochastic model,
as well as in the values of weights and thresholds, suffices. By Def. 4, an identical situation is verified for L.
Finally, the running sum Sum takes values in {−K ·W, . . . ,K ·W}, hence it also verifies such bounds. Overall,
the memory needed by the combined strategy is polynomial in the size of the input game and the stochastic
model, and in the weight and threshold values.
Aggregating all these bounds, we conclude that the global strategy also requires memory at most poly-
nomial in the size of the game and the stochastic model, and in the values, thus proving the upper bound.
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It remains to show that pseudo-polynomial memory is really necessary in general. In order to achieve
this, we introduce a family of games, (G(X))X∈N0 , such that winning the BWC problem on G(X) requires
memory polynomial in the largest weight W = X + 5. This family is presented in Fig. 5. Let the worst-case
threshold be µ = 0 and the expectation threshold be an arbitrary value ν ∈ ]1, 5/4[. Thanks to Thm. 2, the
BWC problem is satisfiable, because G(X) is reduced to a winning EC with no edge of probability zero, and
the optimal expectation is 5/4 > ν (expectation achieved by the memoryless strategy that always chooses
edge (s1, s3)). Notice that it cannot be achieved by the memoryless strategy that always chooses edge (s1, s2)
since this strategy induces a mean-payoff equal to 1 < ν. Hence it is mandatory to choose (s1, s3) infinitely
often in order to achieve the expected value requirement (Eq. (2)).
Let λ1 ∈ ΛF1 be a finite-memory strategy of P1 that satisfies the BWC problem. Observe that it may as
well be pure, i.e., λ1 ∈ Λ
PF
1 as choosing edge (s1, s3) with a non-zero probability recurrently yields consistent
outcomes that do not satisfy the worst-case requirement (Eq. (1)). Also observe that anytime edge (s1, s3)
is chosen, there is a probability 1/2 that the edge of weight −X is taken to come back. Hence, from some
point on, every appearence of this edge of weight −X must be eventually counteracted in order to preserve
the worst-case requirement. A finite number of non-compensated occurences is not a problem thanks to
the prefix-independence of the mean-payoff value function. Looking at the involved weights, it is clear that
taking the edge (s1, s2) for (⌊X/2⌋ + 1) times is necessary to counteract the negative edge of weight −X .
Hence, memory polynomial in X (hence in W ) is needed to ensure both the worst-case and the expected
value requirements for the given thresholds. This concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
4.11 Infinite-memory strategies
We close our study of the BWC problem for the mean-payoff value function by considering what happens
when P1 is allowed to use infinite-memory strategies. Specifically, we show that in this context, infinite-
memory strategies are in general strictly more powerful than finite-memory ones: they can exploit losing
ECs to benefit from their possibly higher optimal expected value; and even inside a single winning EC,
they can be optimal with regard to the expectation whereas finite-memory ones are limited to ε-optimality.
Nonetheless, as discussed in the introduction, such strategies are ill-suited for the synthesis of implementable
controllers for real-world applications, hence our focus on finite memory in the previous results.
s0s1 s2
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1
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U1 U2
Fig. 6: Infinite-memory strategies may use losing ECs
forever with a non-zero probability in order to increase
the expected value.
Losing end-components may still be useful.
Let us consider the game depicted in Fig. 6, to-
gether with a memoryless stochastic model of the
adversary λstoch2 ∈ Λ
M
2 , modeled by the probabil-
ities 1/10 and 9/10 on the edges leaving s1. The
MDP P = G[λstoch2 ] can be decomposed into two
end-components U1 and U2, as depicted by the
dashed lines. Assume the worst-case threshold is
µ = −3/2 (notice for once we take it different than
zero), then U1 is losing (because P2 can induce
an outcome of mean-payoff value −4/2 ≤ −3/2,
and he can do that by choosing edges in E∆) and
U2 is winning (as the only outcome yields mean-
payoff −1 > −3/2), following Def. 2. As shown in
Lemma 8, any finite-memory strategy of P1 which
ensures a mean-payoff strictly greater than µ, leaves U1 with probability one against λ
stoch
2 , because states of
U1 are classified as negligible. Therefore, in order to satisfy the worst-case requirement of the BWC problem,
the expected mean-payoff of any finite-memory strategy of P1 is ν∗2 = −1, i.e., the expectation obtained in
U2 by the only possible outcome. Notice however that if we forget about the worst-case requirement, the
maximal expectation that P1 could achieve in U1 is ν∗1 =
1
2 · (
9
10 · 4 +
1
10 · (−4)) =
8
5 .
We now show that P1 can ensure the worst-case requirement and obtain an expected value strictly greater
than −1, if he is allowed to use infinite memory. We define a pure infinite-memory strategy λ1 for P1 as
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follows: λ1 stores the running sum along the prefix played so far, and chooses to move from s0 to s1 as long
as this sum is strictly greater than zero (except in the first round where it moves directly to s1). First, notice
that this strategy trivially guarantees a mean-payoff greater than or equal to −1 > µ. Indeed, either the
running sum always stays strictly positive, implying that the mean-payoff is at least zero, or the running
sum gets negative or null at some point, in which case the strategy switches to U2 and the mean-payoff takes
value −1. Second, let us compute the expected mean-payoff of this strategy against λstoch2 . Let pswitch denote
the probability to switch to U2 along a play, as prescribed by the strategy λ1. By definition, it is equal to
the probability, when playing inside the EC U1 and starting from an initial credit of zero in state s0, to
come back to s0 with a credit less than or equal to zero after an arbitrary number of steps. Formally, let
M be the MC induced by the subgame G ⇂ U1 and λ
stoch
2 (note that P1 has no choice in it). We have that
pswitch = P
M
s0
(
{pi ∈ OutsM (s0) | ∃ i > 0, Last(pi(i)) = s0 ∧ TP(pi(i)) ≤ 0}
)
.
Determining the probability pswitch of the running sum hitting zero is equivalent to a well-studied problem
on MCs: the gambler’s ruin problem [26]. Applying results on this problem, we obtain that, if the probabilities
9/10 and 1/10 are respectively replaced by arbitrary probabilities p and q such that p > q, the probability
that the gambler is eventually ruined is q
p
. In our example, this implies that pswitch = 1/9.
We are now able to use this result to provide a lower bound for the expected value of the strategy λ1.
Consider the set of outcomes OutsG(s0, λ1, λ
stoch
2 ): it can be partitioned into the set of plays that stay in U1,
for which the mean-payoff is trivially bounded by zero as discussed before; and the set of plays that reach U2,
for which the mean-payoff is equal to −1. Hence, the overall expectation respects the following inequality:
E
G[λ1,λ
stoch
2 ]
s0 (MP) ≥ pswitch · (−1)+ (1− pswitch) · 0 = −
1
9 > −1. Strategy λ1 yields an expectation at least equal
to −1/9, hence strictly greater than the expectation achievable by any finite-memory strategy satisfying the
BWC problem, which we have shown to be equal to −1.
Intuitively, the added power of infinite memory comes from the possibility to memorize an unbounded
running sum, whereas finite memory implies an upper bound on such a sum. In the first case, P1 will be
able to properly acknowledge that some plays see their running sum diverging without ever dropping to zero
(the set of such plays has a strictly positive probability in our example), which lets him benefit from the
added expectation without endangering the worst-case requirement. In the second case, P1 sees all running
sums as upper bounded by some value X ∈ N due to its limited memory. As such, when he sees a sequence
of weights whose total sum is −X , an event that occurs almost-surely infinitely often when an outcome pi
is such that Inf(pi) = U for some EC U ∈ L = E \ W , P1 will believe its running sum hits zero, whether it
really does or not. Consequently, he has to leave U1 eventually to ensure the worst-case requirement.
Optimal expected values can be reached in winning end-components. Consider a setting satisfying
Assumption 1: a game G reduced to a winning EC such that E∆ = E. Let µ = 0, as usual. In Sect. 4.6, we
have seen that, for all ε > 0, it is possible to combine a worst-case strategy λwc1 with an optimal expectation
strategy λe1 into a finite-memory strategy λ
cmb
1 that ensures satisfaction of the BWC problem for thresholds
(0, ν∗ − ε), where ν∗ is the maximal expected value in P = G[λstoch2 ].
In general, it is not possible to construct a finite-memory strategy λcmb1 that ensures the worst-case while
inducing an expected value exactly equal to ν∗ against the stochastic model. See for example the game
G ⇂ U3 in Fig. 2: clearly, P1 has to use (s10, s9) infinitely often to ensure the worst-case, and when using
finite memory, the contribution (in terms of proportion of cycles played) of the corresponding cycle in the
overall expectation can be lower bounded by a strictly positive probability, hence inducing an expected value
strictly lower than ν∗ = 2.
Nonetheless, it is possible to build an infinite-memory strategy, λinf1 , that exactly achieves this expectation
while verifying the worst-case threshold. It is in essence similar to the finite-memory combined strategy
(Def. 3). Consider the following argument. Observe that in the analysis of the combined strategy (Sect. 4.6),
we show that when parameters K and L(K) tend to infinity, the expectation induced by λcmb1 tends to ν
∗.
Moreover, the worst-case is always ensured by choice of L(K). Hence, we possess all the elements needed to
construct λinf1 : it suffices to implement a strategy that plays as λ
cmb
1 , but sequentially increasing the values
of K and L(K) up to infinity. Formally, let (Ki)i∈N be a strictly increasing sequence of naturals, and for all
i ≥ 0, let L(Ki) be the natural given by Def. 4.
The strategy λinf1 is defined as follows:
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(init) Initialize i to 0.
(a) Play λe1 for Ki steps and memorize Sum ∈ Z, the sum of weights encountered during these Ki steps.
(b) If Sum > 0, then go to (a).
Else, play λwc1 during L(Ki) steps, then increment i and go to (a).
By doing so, it is possible to show that λinf1 ensures an expected mean-payoff exactly equal to ν
∗, as well as
the worst-case requirement. For the worst-case, it suffices to apply the reasoning developed in Lemma 10. To
show that λinf1 achieves the expected value ν
∗, the intuitive argument is that the probability that a period of
type (a) is followed by a period of type (b) tends to zero as Ki grows, since ν
∗ > 0. Therefore, the probability
that λwc1 is played infinitely many times is zero. Indeed, consider the example of Fig. 2. By playing λ
inf
1 as
above, P1 can ensure the worst-case requirement and induce the optimal expected mean-payoff 2, because
the proportion of time spent following strategy λe1 will tend to one as the parameter Ki tends to infinity.
Solving the BWC problem for infinite-memory strategies. The problem was recently studied by
Clemente and Raskin in [13], where they showed that it also belongs in NP ∩ coNP.
5 Truncated Sum Value Function - Shortest Path Problem
Consider a game G = (G, S1, S2) with an underlying graph G = (S,E,w) such that the weight function
w : E → N0 assigns strictly positive integer weights to all edges, and a target set of states T ⊆ S that P1
wants to reach with a path of bounded value. That is, P1 aims to ensure some threshold on the truncated sum
value function TST . In other words, we study the BWC synthesis problem for the shortest path problem [2,17].
More precisely, given an initial state sinit ∈ S, a worst-case threshold µ ∈ N (we assume a natural threshold
w.l.o.g. as all weights take positive integer values and so does the truncated sum function for any play
reaching T ), an expected value threshold ν ∈ Q and a finite-memory stochastic model λstoch2 for the adversary,
the problem is to decide if P1 has a finite-memory strategy λ1 ∈ ΛF1 such that{
∀λ2 ∈ Λ2, ∀pi ∈ OutsG(sinit, λ1, λ2), TST (pi) < µ
E
G[λ1,λ
stoch
2 ]
sinit (TST ) < ν
Hence, regarding Def. 1, the inequalities are reversed. We assume that ν < µ. Equivalently, the problem
could be stated with value function −TST without changing the definition.
We establish the following results. First, satisfaction of the BWC problem for the truncated sum value
function can be decided in pseudo-polynomial time (Sect. 5.1). Second, pseudo-polynomial memory may be
necessary to satisfy the BWC problem and that it always suffices (Sect. 5.2). Third, the decision problem
cannot be solved in polynomial time unless P = NP by providing an NP-hardness result (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 A pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
To solve the decision problem, we proceed as follows. First, we show how to construct, from the original game
G and the worst-case threshold µ, a new game Gµ such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the strategies of P1 in Gµ and the strategies of P1 in the original game G that are winning for the worst-case
requirement (Eq. (1)). To construct this game, we unfold the original graph G, tracking the current value of
the truncated sum up to the worst-case threshold µ, and integrating this value in the states of an expanded
graph G′. In the corresponding game G′, we then compute the set of states R from which P1 can reach the
target set with cost lower than the worst-case threshold and we define the subgame Gµ = G
′ ⇂ R such that
any path in the graph of Gµ satisfies the worst-case requirement. Second, assuming that Gµ is not empty,
we can now combine it with the the stochastic Moore machine M(λstoch2 ) of the adversary to construct an
MDP in which we search for a P1 strategy that ensures reachability of T with an expected cost strictly lower
than ν (Eq. (2)). If such a strategy exists, it is guaranteed that it will also satisfy the worst-case requirement
against any strategy of P2 thanks to the bijection evoked earlier.
Hence, for the shortest path, our approach is sequential, first solving the worst-case, then optimizing the
expected value among the worst-case winning strategies. Observe that this approach is not applicable to the
mean-payoff, as in that case there exists no obvious finite representation of the worst-case winning strategies.
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Theorem 5. The beyond worst-case problem for the shortest path can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time:
polynomial in the size of the game graph, the Moore machine for the stochastic model of the adversary and
the encoding of the expected value threshold, and polynomial in the value of the worst-case threshold.
Proof. Let G = (G, S1, S2) be the two-player game, G = (S,E,w) its underlying graph, w : E → N0 its
weight function, sinit ∈ S the initial state, T ⊆ S the target set, λstoch2 ∈ Λ
F
2 the stochastic model of P2,
with M(λstoch2 ) = (Mem,m0, αu, αn) its Moore machine, µ ∈ N the worst-case threshold, and ν ∈ Q the
expected value threshold. Based on G and µ, we define the game G′ = (G′, S′1, S
′
2). Its underlying graph
G′ = (S′, E′, w′) is built by unfolding the original graph G, tracking the current value of the truncated sum
up to the worst-case threshold µ, and integrating this value in the states of G′. Formally, we have that
– S′1 = S1 × ({0, 1, . . . , µ− 1} ∪ {⊤}), S
′
2 = S2 × ({0, 1, . . . , µ− 1} ∪ {⊤}), and S
′ = S′1 ∪ S
′
2;
– E′ =
{(
(s1, u1), (s2, u2)
)
∈ S′ × S′ | (s1, s2) ∈ E ∧ u2 = u1 + w((s1, s2))
}
, with the convention that, for
all c ∈ N, ⊤+ c = ⊤, and, for all u ∈ N, u+ c = ⊤ if u+ c ≥ µ;
– ∀ e =
(
(s1, u1), (s2, u2)
)
∈ E′, w′(e) = w((s1, s2)).
The symbol ⊤ represents costs exceeding the worst-case threshold µ. The initial state in G′ is s′init = (sinit, 0),
and the target set is T ′ = T × {0, 1, . . . , µ − 1}, i.e., in G′ the target set is restricted to copies of states of
the original target set that are reached with a sum less than µ. Notice that for any state s′1 = (s1,⊤) ∈ S
′,
all its successors in G′ are of the form s′2 = (s2,⊤).
Now, we compute in G′ the set of states R ⊆ S′ from which P1 has a strategy to force reaching T ′ using
a classical attractor computation, i.e., R = AttrP1G′ (T
′) (cf. Sect. 2). Clearly, all states outside this attractor
set are losing for the worst-case requirement. Indeed, from any state outside of R, either P1 cannot force
reaching a state s′ = (s, u) with s ∈ T , or he can only do it for u = ⊤. In particular, if s′init = (sinit, 0) 6∈ R
then we know that P1 cannot enforce the worst-case threshold in the original game G, and we can stop here
in this case: no strategy exists for the BWC problem.
Assume that s′init = (sinit, 0) ∈ R. Let us write Gµ = G
′ ⇂ R. Note that there will be deadlocks in Gµ (i.e.,
states with no successors): this is guaranteed since the sum of weights is strictly growing (recall w : E → N0)
and states of the form (s,⊤) do not belong to R by definition. However, the only deadlocks will be on states
that are in T ′ ⊆ R (by definition of R as the attractor of T ′). Hence, we get rid of them by adding self-loops
of weight zero (this does not change the truncated sum up to T ′ by definition of TST ′). It is easy to see that
all strategies λ1 ∈ Λ1(Gµ) are winning for the worst-case requirement, and that there is a bijection between
the winning strategies for the worst-case requirement in the original game G and the strategies in Gµ.
We are now equipped to handle the expectation objective. We proceed as follows. First, we take the
product of Gµ and M(λstoch2 ) = (Mem,m0, αu, αn), following the construction of Lemma 4 (the proof holds
for the truncated sum value function as well). On the product game, we again preserve correspondence
with the worst-case winning strategies in the original game G. Applying the memoryless stochastic model
(resulting of Lemma 4) on the product game, we obtain an MDP P . It is then clear that P1 has a strategy
to enforce an expected value strictly less than the threshold ν in P if and only if P1 has a strategy that both
enforces the worst-case threshold against any strategy λ2 ∈ Λ2(G), and the expectation threshold against
λstoch2 in G. To decide if such a strategy exists, we compute the minimal achievable expected value on P
and we compare it against the threshold ν. Thanks to the reduction from truncated sum to total-payoff
proposed in the preliminaries (Sect. 2), we know that this optimal value can be achieved by a memoryless
strategy and its computation can be executed in polynomial time in the size of the encoding of P via linear
programming [20]. Hence, it requires time polynomial in the size of the encoding of G and M(λstoch2 ), and
polynomial in the value µ (since |S′| = |S| · (µ+ 1)). ⊓⊔
5.2 Memory requirements
In the next theorem, we characterize the memory needed by strategies satisfying the BWC problem.
Theorem 6. Memory of pseudo-polynomial size may be necessary and is always sufficient to satisfy the
BWC problem for the shortest path: polynomial in the size of the game and the stochastic model, and poly-
nomial in the worst-case threshold value.
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Proof. The upper bound on the size of the memory can be obtained directly from the construction exposed
in the proof of Thm. 5. Indeed, we have shown that if the BWC problem can be satisfied, the memoryless
strategy that minimizes the expectation in the MDP P does satisfy it. Translated back to the original
game, this strategy has a memory which is polynomial in |G|, |M(λstoch2 )|, and the value of µ. Intuitively,
the strategy needs to memorize the current value of the sum of weights, up to the value of the worst-case
threshold (at which point it does not matter to bookkeep it anymore as P1 has already failed to enforce
the worst-case requirement). Hence, such a strategy requires memory polynomial in the input game and the
stochastic model, and in the threshold.
To prove that pseudo-polynomial memory may be necessary, we introduce a family (G(µ))µ∈{13+k·4|k∈N}
of games, indexed by the value of the worst-case threshold. This value is taken in a specific set {13 + k · 4 |
k ∈ N} mostly to ease the following calculations. The family is presented in Fig. 7: it consists of three states
S = {s1, s2, s3}. The weight function only assigns strictly positive weights as assumed in the setting of the
shortest path problem. All weights are equal to 1 except for edge (s1, s3) which has a weight
⌊
µ
2
⌋
. Notice
that µ is chosen odd and such that
⌊
µ
2
⌋
is even. We will consider the values of the expectation threshold ν
that can be ensured by a BWC strategy in such a game, under the chosen worst-case threshold µ and against
a stochastic model assigning uniform distributions, and show that to minimize this value, P1 needs to use
linear memory in µ, hence proving the claim.
s1 s2
s3
1
2
1
2
1
1
⌊µ
2
⌋
1
1
Fig. 7: Family of games requiring memory linear in µ for the BWC problem.
First, observe that if the running sum of weights (which is an integer value) gets strictly larger than
⌊
µ
2
⌋
,
then P1 has lost the worst-case requirement (Eq. (1)) as playing (s1, s2) does not guarantee reaching T , and
playing (s1, s3) induces a total cost at least equal to µ. Hence, when in s1 with a running sum equal to
⌊
µ
2
⌋
,
P1 has no valid choice but to take the edge (s1, s3). Since randomization clearly does not help (as it will
produce consistent outcomes that are losing if the edge (s1, s2) is repeatedly assigned a non-zero probability),
defining the optimal strategy of P1 boils down to deciding for how long he should take the edge (s1, s2) before
switching (if at all).
We claim that it should maximize the number of passes in s2 (Fig. 8). Let n denotes the number of
times P1 chooses (s1, s2) before switching. Clearly, to guarantee satisfaction of the worst-case requirement,
we need 2 · n +
⌊
µ
2
⌋
< µ. Since the threshold is odd, we have 2 · n +
⌊
µ
2
⌋
< 2 · n + µ2 . Hence, it suffices to
have 2 · n+ µ2 ≤ µ, or equivalently, n ≤
µ
4 . Note that this bound is linear in the value of µ. What remains to
prove is that increasing the number of passes results in a decrease of the expected value. Let e(n) denotes
the expected value induced by the strategy that plays edge (s1, s2) for n times before switching. Careful
computation reveals that e(n) can be expressed as follows: e(n) =
∑n−1
i=0
1
2i−1 +
1
2n ·
⌊
µ
2
⌋
. Our thesis is that
for all n ≥ 0, e(n) < e(n− 1). By the previous equation, that is
n−1∑
i=0
1
2i−1
+
1
2n
·
⌊µ
2
⌋
<
n−2∑
i=0
1
2i−1
+
1
2n−1
·
⌊µ
2
⌋
⇔
1
2n−2
−
1
2n
·
⌊µ
2
⌋
< 0 ⇔
⌊µ
2
⌋
>
2n
2n−2
= 4 ⇔ µ > 9,
and the last inequality is true thanks to the hypothesis that µ ∈ {13 + k · 4 | k ∈ N}. This shows that
increasing n decreases the expectation, as wanted.
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1
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1
2
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2
⌋
Fig. 8: Partial representation of the Markov chain induced by the BWC strategy that minimizes the expected
cost to target in G(µ), µ ∈ {13 + k · 4 | k ∈ N}.
In conclusion, the optimal BWC strategy for the expected value criterion consists in playing (s1, s2)
for exactly n =
⌊
µ
4
⌋
times, then swithing to (s1, s3) to ensure the worst-case (the corresponding MC is
represented in Fig. 8). Following our computations, it is possible to impose that playing this strategy is
necessary to satisfy the BWC problem by taking the expected value threshold such that e(n) < ν ≤ e(n−1).
This proves that memory linear in µ is needed for the given family of games. ⊓⊔
Remark 10. In contrast to the case of the mean-payoff value function (Sect. 4.11), infinite memory gives no
additional power here. Indeed, the proof of Thm. 5 gives a complete representation of worst-case winning
strategies through the game Gµ and it is further proved that finite memory suffices to define an optimal
strategy with regard to the expected value criterion among these worst-case winning strategies.
5.3 NP-hardness of the decision problem
We conclude our study of the BWC problem in the shortest path setting (i.e., for the truncated sum value
function) by showing that it is very unlikely that a truly-polynomial (i.e., also polynomial in the size of
the encoding of the worst-case threshold) time algorithm exists, as we establish in Thm. 7 that the decision
problem is NP-hard. We prove it by reduction from the Kth largest subset problem [22]. A recent paper by
Haase and Kiefer [27] shows that this Kth largest subset problem is actually PP-complete. Thus, it suggests
that the BWC shortest path problem does not belong to NP at all, otherwise the polynomial hierarchy would
collapse to PNP by Toda’s theorem [40].
The Kth largest subset problem is expressed as follows. Given a finite set A, a size function h : A→ N0
assigning strictly positive integer values to elements of A, and two naturals K,L ∈ N, decide if there exist K
distinct subsets Ci ⊆ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, such that h(Ci) =
∑
a∈Ci
h(a) ≤ L for all K subsets. The NP-hardness
of this problem was proved in [30] via a Turing reduction from the partition problem.
choice
swc
se
target
0
1
1
1
1
1
x3
x2
x1
Fig. 9: Choice gadget: choosing se is best for the ex-
pected value, but it is safe with regard to the worst-
case if and only if the random subset selection pro-
duced a subset C such that h(C) ≤ L.
The crux of the reduction is as follows. We build a
game composed of two gadgets. The random subset se-
lection gadget (Fig. 10) stochastically generates paths
that represent subsets of A: all subsets are equiprob-
able. The choice gadget follows (Fig. 9): P1 decides
either to go to se, which leads to lower expected val-
ues (and lower is better in our setting) but may be
dangerous for the worst-case requirement, or to go
to swc, which is always safe with regard to the worst-
case but induces a higher expected cost. The trick is to
define values of the thresholds and the weights used in
the gadgets such that an optimal (i.e., minimizing the
expectation while guaranteeing the worst-case thresh-
old) strategy for P1 consists in choosing se only when
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the randomly generated subset C ⊆ A satisfies h(C) ≤ L, as asked by the Kth largest subset problem; and
such that this strategy satisfies the BWC problem if and only if there exist K distinct subsets that verify
this bound, i.e., if and only if the answer to the Kth largest subset problem is Yes.
a1 a2 a3 an choice
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
hn(a1) hn(a2) hn(an)
1 1 1
Fig. 10: Random subset selection gadget: an element is selected in the subset if the upper edge is taken when
leaving the corresponding state.
Theorem 7. The beyond worst-case problem for the shortest path is NP-hard.
Proof. We establish a reduction from the Kth largest subset problem: given a finite set A = {a1, . . . , an}
(hence n = |A|), a size function h : A → N0, and two naturals K,L ∈ N, decide if there exist K distinct
subsets Ci ⊆ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, such that h(Ci) =
∑
a∈Ci
h(a) ≤ L for all K subsets. This problem is known
to be NP-hard [30,22]. Note that the restriction to N0 for the codomain of h in place of N is w.l.o.g. as the
problem is satisfied for A, K, L and h : A→ N if and only if it is satisfied for A′ = A \ {a ∈ A | h(a) = 0},
K ′ =
⌊
K
2|A|−|A′|
⌋
, L′ = L and h′ : A′ → N0 such that for all a ∈ A′, h′(a) = h(a). Obviously, we should have
K ≤ 2n, otherwise the problem is trivial since we cannot find a sufficient number of distinct subsets.
Before giving the details of our reduction, we define, given A and h, the function hn : A→ N0 such that
for each a ∈ A, hn(a) = (n+ 1) · h(a). Clearly, it satisfies the following property:
∀C ⊆ A, h(C) ≤ L⇔ hn(C) ≤ (n+ 1) · L. (10)
We present two gadgets used to construct a game and a BWC shortest path problem such that the answer
to the Kth largest subset problem is Yes if and only if the answer to the BWC problem is also Yes.
First, the fragment of the game graph depicted in Fig. 10 is called the random subset selection gadget.
All its states belong to P2, except for the last one, and model the selection (or not) of an element of A in
a subset. Basically, there is a bijection between paths in this gadget and subsets of A: an element ai ∈ A is
selected by the gadget if the outgoing upper edge is taken when leaving state ai, and not selected when the
outgoing lower edge is taken. To be able to formally distinguish between such paths, which we usually define
as sequence of states, we should introduce dummy states to split edges. We omit this technical trick for the
sake of simplicity. The stochastic model followed by P2 in the BWC shortest path problem we construct is
the uniform distribution: the upper and lower edges are equiprobable in all states. This gadget verifies the
following important properties.
1. All subsets are equiprobable: they have probability 12n to be selected.
2. If the gadget selects a subset C ⊆ A through the corresponding path pC , the total sum of weights along
pC , denoted by t(pC), is equal to hn(C) + n− |C|.
By Eq. (10), we have that
∀C ⊆ A, h(C) = L⇔ (n+ 1) · L ≤ t(pC) < (n+ 1) · (L + 1). (11)
Indeed, consider the following. Observe that 0 ≤ n − |C| ≤ n, for any subset C ⊆ A. Hence the left-
to-right implication is trivial. For the converse, we directly deduce the following equivalent expression:
L− n−|C|
n+1 ≤ h(C) < L+ 1−
n−|C|
n+1 . The left inequality implies that L− 1 < h(C), and since h(C) ∈ N, that
L ≤ h(C). The right inequality implies that h(C) < L + 1, and using the same argument, that h(C) ≤ L.
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We conclude that Eq. (11) is true. Consequently, we define the value T = (n+ 1) · (L + 1)− 1, which is an
upper bound on the value t(pC) ≤ T of a path corresponding to a subset C ⊆ A such that h(C) ≤ L.
Now consider the second gadget, called the choice gadget and depicted in Fig. 9. This gadget comes after
the random subset selection gadget. Its aim is to discriminate subsets generated by the preceding gadget
based on whether or not they satisfy the upper bound h(C) ≤ L. Observe the shared choice state. There,
P1 has the choice to go up to state se or down to state swc. Both belong to P2. Again, probabilities for the
stochastic model of the adversary are depicted in Fig. 9. So, in se, an arbitrary strategy of P2 can decide to
impose cost x1 or cost x2 before reaching the target set of the game. Nonetheless, the stochastic model λ
stoch
2
of P2 assigns probability zero to the edge of weight x1: the expectation of any strategy of P1 against this
stochastic model will be independent of the value x1. In swc, the cost added is always equal to x3. Intuitively,
we will choose values so that to minimize his expected cost-to-target, P1 should choose se, but also so that
the worst-case requirement implies that it is only safe to choose this state if the previous path defined a
subset that satisfies the bound h(C) ≤ L given by the Kth largest subset problem.
To complete the description of the reduction, we need to precise the values of the thresholds µ and ν,
and the weights x1, x2 and x3. Assume that we choose the worst-case threshold and the weights such that:
(a) T + 1 + x1 + 1 ≥ µ, i.e., going to se with a path pC (obtained in the random subset selection gadget)
of cost t(pC) > T (i.e., with a selected subset C ⊆ A such that h(C) > L by Eq. (11)) is losing for the
worst-case threshold if P2 takes the edge of weight x1;
(b) T + x1 + 1 < µ and T + x2 + 1 < µ, i.e., going to se with a path pC of cost t(pC) ≤ T (i.e., h(C) ≤ L)
is safe for the worst-case requirement whatever the choice of P2;
(c) for all C ⊆ A, we have that t(pC) + x3 + 1 < µ, i.e., going to swc is always safe for the worst-case
requirement.
Then clearly, P1 can always choose to go to swc and ensure the worst-case threshold, but he can go up only
if the chosen subset C satisfies h(C) ≤ L, which is equivalent to say that t(pC) ≤ T . We add the following
constraints to the choices of the expectation threshold and the weights:
(d) in order to minimize the expected truncated sum in the MDP defined by the stochatic model, the optimal
choice for P1 is to always take se when possible (i.e., when h(C) ≤ L, or equivalently t(pC) ≤ T because
of the constraint (a) defined above);
(e) the expected value ν∗ of this optimal choice satisfies the expectation requirement (i.e., ν∗ < ν) if and
only if the number of distinct subsets Ci ⊆ A verifying h(Ci) ≤ L is larger than or equal to K.
We will now define values such that properties (a) through (e) are ensured. First, let Q = max{t(pC) |
C ⊆ A} = t(pA) be the maximal cost of a path in the random subset selection gadget (the equality with
t(pA) is thanks to the size function h assigning strictly positive values). We claim the needed properties are
verified for the following values: µ = 2n+1 · n · (Q+ 2), ν =
(
K · (T + 2) + (2n −K) · µ
)
/2n, x1 = µ− T − 2,
x2 = 1, and x3 = µ−Q− 2. Using these, we review each property one-by-one. For (a), we obtain by simple
substitutions (a) ⇔ T + 1+ µ− T − 2 + 1 ≥ µ ⇔ 0 ≥ 0, which is obvious. Similarly, for (b), we have that
(b) ⇔ (T + µ− T − 2 + 1 < µ) ∧ (T + 1+ 1 < µ) ⇔ (−1 < 0) ∧ (T + 2 < 2n+1 · n · (Q+ 2)). (12)
The first term of the conjunction is trivially true so we focus on the second one. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that L < h(A) as otherwise the Kth largest subset problem reduces to decide if K ≤ 2n.
Thus, we deduce the inequality T < (n + 1) · (h(A) + 1) − 1. Also note that, by definition, we have that
Q = t(pA) = hn(A) = (n+1) ·h(A). Using these inequalities in Eq. (12), we derive that proving the following
central inequality suffices to obtain (b):
T + 2 < (n+ 1) · (h(A) + 1) + 1 ≤ 2n+1 · n · ((n+ 1) · h(A) + 2) = 2n+1 · n · (Q+ 2).
This boils down to (2n+1 · n− 1) · (n+ 1) · h(A) + (2 · 2n+1 − 1) · n− 2 ≥ 0, which is true for n ≥ 1 (which
we can assume otherwise A = ∅ and the problem is trivial). Hence, property (b) is verified by our choice of
values. Now, consider property (c). We have (c) ⇔ t(pC)+µ−Q−2+1 < µ ⇔ t(pC) < Q+1, which is true
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by definition of Q as the maximum over the values of paths. Regarding property (d), we have to show that
choosing se gives an expectation strictly lower (recall we want to minimize it) than choosing swc. Observe
that due to the particular structure of the game graph, the strategy of P1 is restricted to this one-shot choice
of edge. Note that in this expected value context, the actual value obtained in the random subset selection
gadget does not matter to decide whether to go to se or to swc: hence it suffices to look at the expectation
from the choice state up to the target state. For se, it is trivially equal to 1 + 1 = 2 as the stochastic model
λstoch2 of P2 always chooses the edge of weight x2. For swc, this expectation is equal to
1 + x3 = 1 + µ−Q− 2 = 2
n+1 · n · (Q + 2)−Q− 1 ≥ (2n+1 · n− 1) · (Q + 2) ≥ (Q+ 2) > 2,
and we obtain the claim (d). Note that an actual strategy that satisfies the BWC problem will only be able
to choose se if the selected path satisfies the bound t(pC) ≤ T , as discussed in properties (a) and (b).
Finally, it remains to show the most involved property (e): proving it will conclude our reduction as we
will obtain that the answer to the Kth largest subset problem is Yes if and only if the answer to the BWC
problem we have defined is Yes. Note that combining the already proved properties (a) through (d), we
know that the strategy λ1 ∈ ΛPF1 that chooses state se when t(pC) ≤ T and state swc otherwise, yields the
minimal expectation value ν∗ under the worst-case constraint of threshold µ. Hence, it suffices to study this
strategy to answer the BWC problem. Our claim is thus that
ν∗ = E
G[λ1,λ
stoch
2 ]
a1 < ν ⇔
∣∣∣ {C ⊆ A | h(C) ≤ L} ∣∣∣ ≥ K, (13)
with G and λstoch2 the game and stochastic model we defined.
For the left-to-right implication, we reason by contradiction and show that if there is only K − 1 (or
less) distinct subsets whose sum is less than or equal to L, then strategy λ1 has an expected cost larger
than or equal to ν. To show that, we use the fact that all paths (i.e., subsets) have equal probability in the
random subset selection gadget, and establish that a lower bound on the sum of all the paths under this
strategy reaches or exceeds 2n · ν. Recall that P2 follows its stochastic model λ
stoch
2 for this matter. First,
let LBe = 0 which is trivially a lower bound for the cost of all the paths that goes through se. Second, let
LBwc = (2
n − (K − 1)) · (T + 1+ x3 + 1): it is clearly a lower bound for the sum of the values of paths that
go through state swc when P1 follows strategy λ1. We have that 2n · ν∗ ≥ LBe + LBwc. Let us now establish
that LBwc ≥ 2n · ν and we will be done. We proceed as follows.
LBwc − 2
n · ν = (2n −K + 1) · (T + 1 + µ−Q− 2 + 1)−K · (T + 2)− (2n −K) · µ
= µ+ (2n −K + 1) · (T −Q)−K · (T + 2)
= 2n+1 · n · (Q+ 2) + (2n −K + 1) · (T −Q)−K · (T + 2)
Recall that T,Q ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ K ≤ 2n (otherwise the answer is trivially No). Furthermore, T is the
upper bound on the values of paths pC representing good subsets, i.e., subsets C ⊆ A such that h(C) ≤ L.
This value is used by the strategy λ1 implemented by P1 to decide whether going to se is safe with regard
to the worst-case requirement or not. As such, we can assume that T ≤ Q, otherwise all paths are safe and
the answer to the problem is trivially Yes (since all subsets respect the bound and K ≤ 2n). Using K ≤ 2n,
T ≥ 0 and T ≤ Q, we can write LBwc − 2n · ν ≥ (2n+1 · n− 2n +K − 1−K) ·Q+ (2n+1 · n · 2− 2 ·K).
To prove that this last expression is non-negative, we analyze its terms. We know that Q ≥ 0. For its
coefficient, we have 2n+1 · n − 2n − 1 ≥ 2n − 1 ≥ 0 because n ≥ 1. For the last term, we use K ≤ 2n and
obtain that 2n+2 ·n−2 ·K ≥ 2n+2−2n+1 = 2n+1 ≥ 0. Hence all terms of the last expression are non-negative
and LBwc ≥ 2n · ν, proving that the left-to-right implication of Eq. (13) is verified.
It remains to prove the right-to-left implication. Assume there are exactly K distinct subsets of sum less
than or equal to L (if there are more, then the bounds below are easier to obtain). We claim that strategy λ1
ensures an expected truncated sum ν∗ strictly lower than ν. To show this, we establish that the total sum of
the outcomes under this strategy of P1 and the stochastic model of P2 is strictly bounded from above by 2n ·ν,
and the claim follows thanks to all paths being equiprobable in the random subset selection gadget. First,
consider the paths that go through se (i.e., all the paths corresponding to subsets C such that h(C) ≤ L).
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By definition of λ1 and our hypothesis, there are exactly K such paths. We define UBe = K · (T + 2), a
clear upper bound for the sum of the values of these paths, by definition of T and λstoch2 . Second, there are
(2n −K) paths that go through swc. Let UBwc = (2n −K) · (Q + 1 + x3) = (2n −K) · (µ − 1) be a bound
for the sum of the values of all these paths. Clearly,
2n · ν∗ ≤ UBe + UBwc = K · (T + 2) + (2
n −K) · (µ− 1) < K · (T + 2) + (2n −K) · µ = 2n · ν
by definition of the expected value threshold ν, and so we are done for this direction.
Having verified both directions of the equivalence given in Eq. (13), the correctness of our reduction
from the Kth largest subset problem is established. Note that it requires values of the thresholds that are
exponential in the size of the set A and polynomial in the value of the largest weight assigned by the size
function h (or equivalently, exponential in its encoding) for the Kth largest subset problem. It also requires
to use edge weights that are polynomial in these values. Observe that this is not a problem, as all those
values may be represented using a logarithmic number of bits, hence polynomially in the characteristics of
the initial Kth largest subset problem. Finally, notice that we do need to consider exponential constants in
our game to obtain the NP-hardness of our problem, as for values polynomial in the size of the game, the
algorithm described in Sect. 5.1 actually operates in truly-polynomial time. This concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we paved the way to a new approach, combining worst-case and expected value requirements in
what we named the beyond worst-case synthesis problem. We believe this setting is adequate to the synthesis
of controllers that must ensure strict guarantees under all circumstances, and prove to be more efficient in
reasonable conditions, a problem for which few theoretical frameworks exist.
We thoroughly studied the BWC synthesis problem in the context of two well-known quantitative mea-
sures: the mean-payoff and the shortest path. For the mean-payoff, we proved the problem to be in NP∩coNP,
matching the complexity of the worst-case threshold problem [45,31,23], which we encompass. Hence, the
BWC setting provides additional modeling power at no complexity cost (in terms of problem solving), a
remarkably positive result. For the shortest path, the BWC problem proves to be harder than the worst-
case threshold problem, going from polynomial to pseudo-polynomial time, with an NP-hardness result.
In both cases, synthesized strategies may require pseudo-polynomial memory, but accept natural, elegant
representations, based on states of the game and simple integer counters.
Possible future work include study of the BWC problem for other quantitative measures, extension of
our results for the mean-payoff and the shortest path to more general settings (multi-dimension [43,12],
decidable classes of games with imperfect information [18,29], etc), and application of the BWC problem to
various practical cases. Given the relevance of the framework for practical applications, it would certainly be
worthwhile to develop tool suites supporting it. We could for example build on symblicit implementations
recently developed for monotonic Markov decision processes by Bohy et al. [3]. Following the publication
of [8], the concept of beyond worst-case synthesis has also been applied to priced timed games in [15].
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